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ABSTRACT
OPERATION BUMPY ROAD 
THE ROLE OF ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE AND THE U.S. NAVY 
IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION
John P. Madden 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr.
The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 was a political 
and military fiasco. President John F. Kennedy inherited 
the plan when he took office in January 1961. Even though 
there was a low probability of success, Kennedy still 
approved the operation. Because of the failure at the Bay 
of Pigs Kennedy lost faith in the Central Intelligence 
Agency [CIA] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]. Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], endorsed the 
need to eliminate Fidel Castro. The role of the CIA is a 
well-worn subject, but what was the role of Admiral Burke 
and the U.S. Navy in the Bay of Pigs operation? This review 
is an historical perspective of the role of Burke and the 
Navy in the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion. It shows that Burke and the Navy did what they 
could to make a poor plan work, but it was not enough. The 
key failure was that it was a civilian-run operation without 
sufficient military support and involvement.
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INTRODUCTION
"Operation Bumpy Road" was the code name for the 
United States Navy's role in the Bay of Pigs operation. The 
Bay of Pigs operation was originally intended to be a covert 
operation to invade Cuba and topple the Castro regime using 
Cuban exiles sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency 
[CIA]. American military participation was to be kept at a 
minimum to avoid linking the United States to the operation. 
Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy went so 
far as to direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] to stay out 
of the actual conduct of the operation. Yet, the United 
States Navy still expected to be called on to provide 
support if needed and did become involved in the operation 
and rescue. For those involved in the operation it became a 
"bumpy road" to follow. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of 
Naval Operations [CNO], and Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, [CINCLANT], foresaw the 
need for prior naval preparation in the event that American 
forces were directed to provide coastal protection of the 
operation, land troops on the beach, or conduct rescue 
missions.
Admiral Burke and the United States Navy wanted the 
Bay of Pigs operation to succeed. Because the Navy
1
L
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supported the decision to remove Fidel Castro from power, 
naval decisions were made and actions were taken to help 
make the operation succeed. Even after receiving specific 
presidential directives to limit their involvement, the Navy 
did what it could to make the plan work, but it was not 
enough.
This study provides a historical perspective 
describing the fall of Fulgencio Batista and subsequent rise 
of Fidel Castro. It traces the rise of Castro and the 
Eisenhower Administration's reaction to the new threat in 
Cuba. It explains the thoughts and reasons behind the 
decisions made by senior administration officials. It 
describes the administration's reactions when it became 
obvious that Castro was developing closer ties with the 
communists. The shift in relations between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union was a major factor in the development of the 
Bay of Pigs operation. Eisenhower felt that it was 
necessary for a plan to be created by the CIA, using no 
overt American military force to oust Castro from power. 
Although Eisenhower's directions were clear, the CIA was not 
in a position to draft a plan without assistance from the 
military. Military guidance was necessary to make the plan 
work. The failure to bring the JCS and Navy into the plan 
at its earliest stages created a lack of military expertise 
in the developmental stages of the operation.
Admiral Burke, a naval hero dating to the Solomon
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Islands campaign during World War II, was the most outspoken 
member of the JCS. He was deeply interested in the rise of 
Castro because of Cuba's strategic importance and the 
security of the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The 
Navy used Guantanamo as a site for ships to receive 
"refresher training." The training tested the crews in war­
time conditions. Damage control, engineering casualty 
control, command and control, seamanship, and gunnery drills 
were conducted on a daily basis. A small detachment of 
American naval personnel was assigned to Guantanamo to 
provide the training and logistical support for the fleet. 
But, most important, Guantanamo remained a key strategic 
link to Cuba for the U.S. Navy. Guantanamo Bay was a deep 
draft port capable of handling ships from frigates to 
aircraft carriers. The base compound included a shipyard 
and refueling facility. Guantanamo was a vast naval complex 
capable of posing a serious threat to Castro's regime if the 
U.S. decided to use it for the launching-point of an 
invasion.
This study provides an explanation of the role Admiral 
Burke and the JCS played in reviewing the various plans 
offered by the CIA. Were Admiral Burke and the Navy active 
participants or passive bystanders? This study shows that 
Admiral Burke and the Navy were opposed to the Castro regime 
because of the strategic implications of a Soviet ally so 
close to the United States. The Navy saw a need to remove
Lk
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Castro from power in order to alleviate strategic planning 
problems in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
The CIA conducted the operation only after the plan 
had been modified so many times that it did not resemble the 
original idea submitted to the JCS for their review. This 
study demonstrates that indecision in Washington because of 
political uncertainties forced modifications that almost 
guaranteed the plan's failure. The JCS, acting on 
directions from the White House, could only review and make 
recommendations. At the fleet level Admiral Dennison did 
what he could to make the operation succeed, but it was not 
enough. With his hands tied by presidential directives, 
Dennison could not commit his total forces to make the plan 
work. The breakdown in the relationship between the 
President and the military and the subsequent refusal to use 
military force in support of the revolutionaries were the 
crucial reasons for the failure of the operation. The 
Administration's failure to establish a realistic and 
clearly attainable objective forced the military into a "no- 
win" situation. As a result, the operation failed miserably 
and the Navy was asked to conduct the evacuation of the 
remaining forces from the beach.
The deteriorating relationship between Cuba and the 
United States is well documented but very little has been 
written of the Navy's role in the Bay of Pigs Operation. 
Narratives such as Mario Lazo's, Dagger in the Heart:
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American Foreign Policy Failures in Cuba. Richard Nixon's, 
Six Crises. Phillip Bonsai's, Cuba, Castro and the United 
States. Maurice Halperin's, The Rise and Decline of Fidel 
Castro. and Richard Welch's, Response to Revolution; The 
U.S. and the Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961. are works which 
detail the fall of Batista, the rise of Castro, and the 
impact on American foreign policy.1 The CIA's role in 
covert operations has also received considerable attention 
from historians and journalists. Secrets. Spies, and 
Scholars, by Ray Cline, The Real CIA, by Lyman Kirkpatrick, 
The CIA's Secret Operations, by Harry Rositzke, and The 
Aaencv: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, by John Ranelagh, 
provide informative details of the role the CIA has played 
as a tool of government officials in seeking foreign policy 
obj ectives.2
To date, very few Navy people involved in the 
operation have been willing to discuss or release
1Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart: American Foreign
Policy Failures in Cuba (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968);
Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday,
1967); Phillip Bonsai, Cuba. Castro and the United States 
(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); Maurice
Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press, 1972); Richard Welch, Response to 
Revolution: The U.S. and the Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1985).
^ay Cline, Secrets. Spies, and Scholars (New York: 
Washington: Acropolis Books, 1976); Lyman Kirkpatrick, The
Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Harry Rositzke, The
CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader’s Digest Press,
1977) ; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
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information concerning the Bay of Pigs. Some openly state 
that they don't want to talk about the operation. There is 
little written material that has been declassified 
describing the naval involvement in the invasion. The 
defeat at the Bay of Pigs was a "black eye" for many naval 
personnel. Admiral Arleigh Burke, as CKO, was responsible 
for keeping the Chairman of the JCS and the President 
informed of the naval problems associated with the 
operation. Burke has been criticized by historians for 
failing to keep Kennedy informed of the perils of the 
planning and execution of the assault. Records concerning 
Burke and the Navy's role remain quite sensitive. The Navy 
is still unwilling to declassify most of the information 
concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Following the operation Kennedy asked General Maxwell 
Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, to come out of 
retirement to chair a committee to look into the reasons for 
the failure at the Bay of Pigs. The resulting Taylor 
Committee Report gives a detailed description of the 
operation and some of the views of the participants. The 
third, and most recently declassified, section goes into 
great detail explaining the Navy's role through JCS messages 
and directives.
The references, though limited, show that Admiral 
Burke and the Navy did what they could to make a poor plan 
work. The Bay of Pigs operation was a military operation
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developed and conducted by civilians with little assistance 
from the military. Unfortunately, governmental limitations 
did not allow the military to assist in such a way as to let 
the plan succeed. The invasion failed miserably and the CIA 
and the JCS were held accountable.
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CHAPTER ONE 
FRIEND OR FOE: THE RISE OF FIDEL CASTRO
On 1 January 1959, Fulgencio Batista, President of 
Cuba, was ousted from power by Fidel Castro. The Batista 
regime created several problems for American foreign policy 
makers. Batista was a totalitarian dictator. Many in the 
United States felt that it was necessary to remove Batista 
from power if a democratic society was going to exist in 
Cuba. Fidel Castro was seen as the new blood that would 
implement radical changes to restore democracy in a country 
torn by civil strife.1
In the United States the rise of Castro was accepted 
with guarded optimism and wary skepticism. Since the early 
days of 1953 his struggle to power was carefully observed in 
Washington. On 26 July 1953 Castro and a small group of his 
followers attacked the Moncado Barracks in Santiago. The 
unsuccessful attempt to force the removal of Batista was the 
foundation of the "26th of July Movement." Castro returned
information concerning the fall of Batista and rise of 
Castro was primarily drawn from Foreign Relations of the 
United States TFRUS1: 1955-1957. vol. VI, Caribbean.
(Washington: USGPO, 1957), and Dwight D. Eisenhower's, The
White House Years: Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1965).
8
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from exile in Mexico in a highly publicized landing in 
Oriente province in 1956. Castro's revolution was based on 
agrarian reform throughout the countryside of Cuba. Castro 
stressed programs intended to aid the oppressed and 
impoverished, which simultaneously reduced the dominance and 
influence of big businesses in Cuba. These programs 
included granting land to small planters and peasants, with 
compensation to land owners, a more equitable share of the 
cane crop to planters, profit-sharing, confiscation of all 
illegally attained property, agricultural cooperatives to 
share equipment, cold storage, and the creation of a uniform 
direction in cultivation and breeding. Most alarming, 
though, Castro encouraged the nationalization of major 
corporations such as the electric and telephone companies.2
Castro and his followers hid in the Sierra Maestra 
jungles and conducted intermittent guerrilla operations 
against Batista strongholds. In addition to striking out 
against Batista, Castro rallied popular support for his 
revolution from the lower class workers and peasants. His 
promises of popular agrarian reform provided hope for the 
people. The numbers of communists within his movement grew 
as the Cuban populace rejected the harsh and corrupt Batista 
rule.
2FRUS. 866n.
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The Eisenhower Administration was split. The Batista 
government was corrupt and had strong ties to American 
businesses, such as the United Fruit Company, the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, Esso, and 
Texaco. If Castro came to power there was uncertainty 
concerning which direction he was going to lead Cuba.
Castro appeared to be anti-communist, yet, he accepted 
communists within his inner circle of advisers. His 
brother, Raul, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, his closest 
adviser, were confirmed communists. Some in the State 
Department saw Castro as an evil necessary to remove Batista 
from power. Others in the Central Intelligence Agency 
[CIA], like Director Allen Dulles, and Deputy Director 
Richard Bissell, Admiral Arleigh Burke of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff [JCS], and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, were 
convinced that Castro would move quickly into the communist 
camp once he consolidated his power base within Cuba.3
While Castro's movements were cautiously observed by 
administration officials, Batista remained a thorn in the 
side of policy makers. Executions of his political 
opponents were common. Although his tactics were brutal, 
Batista was an ally of the United States. The United States 
tolerated Batista's abuses of power because he supported 
American interests in Cuba and abroad. Following Batista's
3Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging
Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 520n.
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assumption of power in 1952, Cuba broke relations with the 
Soviet Union, outlawed the communist party, supported the 
United Nations' efforts in Korea, and was a major supporter 
of the CIA-sponsored overthrow of Guatemalan strongman 
Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Despite his support of the United 
States, Batista's dictatorial regime fomented discontent 
throughout Cuba. As popular uprisings spread, Batista's 
stranglehold of Cuba became more oppressive. Insurrection 
was rampant.4 The Eisenhower Administration was in a 
quandary on how to handle the Cuban situation.
Principal opposition groups in Cuba included Fidel 
Castro's "26th of July Movement," the Sanchez Arango 
organization, the Revolutionary Directorate Federation, and 
university students under Jose Antonio Echevarria. Fidel 
Castro's movement was the primary opposition group capable 
of providing a substantial threat to Batista. In October 
1956, the American embassy in Havana warned the State 
Department that popular uprisings and insurrections were 
probable by the start of the year.5 Political murders 
continued with alarming frequency. The government blamed 
its opposition. The opposition cited the murders as 
examples of the government's use of the police and military 
to brutally oppress civil liberties throughout Cuba.
4"U.S.-Cuba Relations Frequently Stormy," New York 
Times. 4 January 1961, 8.
5FRUS. 835-37.
k
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Senior government officials in Washington sent 
conflicting signals to Havana. The U.S. government objected 
to Batista's thuggery but turned its back while American 
military goods continued to be shipped to Havana. In 
January 1957 the American embassy in Havana recommended that 
the U.S. officially protest Batista's use of brute force in 
squelching opposition and civil rights. Secretary of state 
John Foster Dulles frowned upon Batista's use of murder and 
intimidation, but refrained from getting directly involved. 
On 16 February 1957 Dulles brushed aside recommendations 
that the U.S. protest, because he did not want to be accused 
of meddling in the affairs of another nation. Dulles 
encouraged the use of diplomacy, discretion, and sound 
judgment to deal with Batista.6 The failure of the 
administration to control Batista's use of American-supplied 
weaponry against the populace had crucial consequences in 
later dealings with the Castro regime.
Anti-Batista sentiment in Cuba grew in the summer of 
1957. Memorandums and telegrams from the embassy in Havana 
repeated earlier warnings of growing popular dissent and 
harsher government reprisals. In September 1957 Ambassador 
Earl T. Smith notified the Secretary of State that Batista 
used American-supplied F-47s and B-26s to put down the 
revolt at Cienfuegos. Some of the equipment was provided
6Ibid., 840-41n.
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through the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, signed in 
March 1952. One of the stipulations in this agreement was 
that the weapons could not be used by a government to 
suppress internal unrest. Again, the response of the United 
States was to tread softly and defer decisions on future 
arms shipments to Batista.7
By late 1957 anti-Batista tensions were acute. The 
Eisenhower Administration began discussing possible 
alternatives to Batista. American short and long-term 
interests in Cuba were threatened by continued support of 
the Batista regime. Opposition grew day by day and if the 
government fell there would be chaos, anarchy, and a great 
deal of uncertainty. U.S. diplomats had to prepare 
contingencies for the possible fall of Batista. Cuban 
political uncertainty made the atmosphere ripe for civil 
unrest. On 21 November 1957 the State Department 
recommended three possible courses of action in dealing with 
the Cuban situation. The first option called for the U.S. 
to remain aloof and allow the "chips to fall." In this 
instance unrest would be allowed to grow and Batista would 
have to fend for himself. The second option consisted of a 
total embargo of military goods to Batista if he failed to 
stop the brutality and oppression. The third option 
consisted of talcing a firm stand in dealings with anti-
7Ibid., 845.
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Batista elements in the U.S. and Cuba. If the U.S. showed 
interest in the opposition groups, anti-American hostilities 
might be avoided if one of those groups came to power.8
Publicly, the Eisenhower Administration opted to 
follow the charter of the Organization of American States 
[OAS] which prohibited the intervention of one country in 
the internal affairs of another. At times, Ambassador Smith 
favored conciliatory measures towards Batista because 
Americans had millions of dollars invested in Cuba. If 
American interests were to be protected, the U.S. had to 
support anti-communist efforts in Cuba.9 By the summer of 
1958 support for Batista in Cuba waned. Privately, the 
administration began seeking a successor favorable to 
American interests. Castro received more support from the 
Cuban population than did any other opposition leader. 
Batista continued to receive support from the upper class 
and the military. The middle class slowly moved towards 
Castro's movement. Some of Eisenhower's advisers urged him 
to continue supporting Batista. Other advisers advocated 
that the rise of Castro was imminent. Still others favored 
neither Batista nor Castro, but rather one of the other
8Ibid., 865.
9Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy.
Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1987), 39-44.
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opposition groups.10 Eisenhower was caught in a no-win 
situation. If he continued to support Batista, he would be 
branded as tolerating the brutal measures imposed by 
Batista. If he followed the advice of some of his advisers 
and opted for Castro, he would be open to charges of letting 
down an ally.
Little by little Batista’s regime crumbled. In 
December 1958 Castro's forces launched an attack against 
Santa Clara in Las Villas province in eastern Cuba. As 
Castro's forces grew to significant numbers, it became more 
difficult for the Batista forces to put down the 
revolutionary movement. Government forces surrendered to 
Castro in vast numbers.11 The mutiny of the military was a 
stepping stone to the eventual fall of Batista. He was 
about to lose the last bastion of support within Cuba.
On 31 December 1958, the imminent fall of Batista was 
discussed in the office of the Secretary of State, Christian 
Herter.12 In attendance were the Secretary of State, Allen 
Dulles, Director of the CIA, Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Deputy 
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, William
10Eisenhower, 521.
11Ibid., 520.
12The information concerning this meeting was drawn 
from notes written by Admiral Burke based on his personal 
recollection. These uncatalogued notes are part of the 
Admiral Arleigh Burke Papers, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as 
"Burke notes."
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Wieland, in charge of the Cuba desk at the State Department, 
Robert Murphy, Deputy Secretary of State, and Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations-[CNO]. Rubottom 
opened the meeting by stating that Batista had lost control 
and was willing to leave Cuba. Rubottom stressed that it 
was essential for the United States to force Batista out of 
office if he delayed any further, and he concluded that the 
U.S. should take advantage of the rise of Castro by trying 
to establish good relations with him. Admiral Burke opposed 
allowing Castro to assume power. The Batista government was 
ruthless and not ideal, but at least Batista maintained good 
relations with the U.S. Burke, therefore, recommended 
putting a group of men in power alongside Batista. Their 
job would be to make sure that Batista continue to protect 
American interests. This group of leaders would manage the 
country while ensuring that Batista still appeared to remain 
in control. Burke claimed that the U.S. was in a position 
to force Batista to accept Washington's directions because 
without American support he would fall from power.13
Admiral Burke was one of the earliest opponents of 
Castro. During his tour as CNO, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence kept a close eye on the progress of the 
movement. There was no doubt in Burke's mind that Castro 
was a communist. Castro's ultimate objective, like that of
13Burke notes, 3-11.
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other dictators, would be the never-ending quest for power.
Burke questioned Castro's intent and character:
A man like Castro is a brilliant man. [He] 
disdains advice free his people. He doesn't have 
much respect for anybody or anything . . .  
including his own people. He was powerful and he 
could make decisions He was wise, usually, and 
he made good decisions. But he was arrogant.
The danger of an arrogant man is that 99 percent 
of his decisions will be correct. [When wrong] 
he will be so damn wrong that he will ruin the 
country.14
Castro's actions in the Sierra Maestra mountains worried 
Burke. Communists in Castro's inner circle of advisers 
fueled Burke's suspicions. In 1958 Castro's forces 
kidnapped naval personnel from the naval base at Guantanamo 
Bay and held them hostage in the Sierra Maestra mountains. 
Burke knew where the hostages were being kept. He was 
prepared to send in Marines to rescue the hostages as soon 
as he received the authorization.15 Castro's frequent 
attacks against Batista strongholds near the U.S. naval base 
at Guantanamo Bay concerned Burke. In the summer of 1958 
Burke, in cooperation with the Cuban government, sent in 
U.S. marines to protect the water pumping stations along the 
Yateras River, which provided fresh water to the Guantanamo
14Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interview by 
author, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia, 23 February 1988.
1sAdmiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interviewed by 
author, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia, 16 September 
1988.
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naval base.16 Burke was concerned that the rise of Castro 
would provide a foothold in the Caribbean to the Soviets and 
threaten the security of the naval base At Guantanamo. In 
the future the Navy would have a greater stake to lose if 
Cuba fell into the hands of the communists.
Few in the meeting accepted Burke's warnings, and he 
was overruled by the State Department officials. Rubottom 
and Wieland argued that the Cuban people would not allow 
Castro to fall into the hands of the communists. They 
explained that it was natural for a revolutionary like 
Castro to include various elements of the opposition within 
the movement. By diversifying his movement, Castro created 
the necessary foundation to generate popular support for his 
causes.17
Dulles and Murphy supported Burke during the meeting 
on New Year's Eve. Secretary of State Herter did not commit 
himself. Those in attendance conceded to the State 
Department's argument that there was no other viable choice 
to replace Batista. Burke continued to argue that it was a 
major responsibility of the U.S. to have Cubans in power who 
were friendly to American interests. Burke claimed that 
American interests were best served by supporting these 
people. Again, Burke was refuted because such American
16Eisenhower, 520.
17Burke notes, 13-17.
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actions were in violation of the OAS charter forbidding 
meddling in the affairs of another country. Burke was 
adamant that Castro would follow the communist line and Cuba 
would eventually become another China. Dulles supported 
Burke's claims that there was communist infiltration in 
Castro's movement but removed his objections when no hard 
evidence could be submitted. Only Burke and Murphy remained 
in opposition to Castro. After a lengthy argument they 
agreed with the others.18
Burke had several misgivings about the policy 
established in the meeting on New Year's Eve in the office 
of the Secretary of State. Burke questioned the influence 
of Wieland on Rubottom. Burke claimed that Rubottom was too 
lax in his examination of Wieland's proposals. Rubottom 
read the material and heard the briefings on the Cuban 
situation and convinced himself that Castro was a non­
threat. Burke considered that people like Rubottom, other 
government officials, and the American press failed to 
accept the potential danger because it was not an imminent 
threat to immediate American interests. Many in the U.S. 
felt that Castro was the liberator of the oppressed in Cuba 
and would establish a democratic society. Administration 
officials ignored Burke's warnings that Castro was 
establishing the foundation of a communist power center
18Ibid.
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while consolidating his power base.19
The following day. New Year's Day, 1 January 1959, the
issue of selecting a replacement for Batista became moot,
for on that morning the dictator fled to exile in the
Dominican Republic. Fidel Castro and his supporters seized
power. The New York Times hailed the rise of Castro in its
2 January 1959 editorial:
One . . . thing must be said and this is an 
acknowledgement to the extraordinary young man,
Fidel Castro, who fought against such heavy odds 
with such tenacity, bravery, and intelligence 
since his pathetically weak band of youths landed 
in Oriente Province on December 2, 1956. A great 
burden now falls on his shoulders, and a task 
harder in its way than the struggle for liberty 
that has now ended. The American people will 
wish him and all Cubans good fortune.
Castro's initial actions showed promise for a
transition to a democratic society. Carlos Manuel Urrutia
Llea and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, two respected Cuban
businessmen, were appointed Provisional President and
Premier, respectively. The Eisenhower Administration showed
good faith by quickly recognizing the new government.21
By the end of January the relationship between the
Castro regime and the Eisenhower Administration soured.
Castro repeatedly attacked the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air
19Ibid.
^"Cuban Dictator Falls," New York Times. 2 January 
1959, 24.
21Eisenhower, 522.
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Force missions in Cuba because they had sponsored the 
training and support that Batista's forces received during 
the revolution. Speaking in Caracas, Venezuela, Castro was 
extremely critical of U.S. policy and its protection of 
"onerous American capital" in Cuba. In February Castro 
appeared on Cuban television blasting the United States for 
historically oppressing Cuba. Premier Cardona resigned as a 
result of his opposition to the direction the Castro 
movement was taking. Following Cardona's resignation Castro 
appointed himself Premier and stated that it was the 
responsibility of the United States to better Cuban-American 
relations. Castro stressed that the United States had to 
purchase more Cuban sugar. Although Castro expected the 
United States to pump more American dollars into the Cuban 
sugar industry, he also claimed that Cuba was no longer 
dependent on the United States and would establish relations 
with any nation it chooses, especially the Soviet Union and 
China.22
It became increasingly obvious to the Eisenhower 
Administration that Castro was moving further away from a 
position of cooperation with the United States. Threats of 
Cuban nationalization of American-owned businesses grew 
along with Castro's biting anti-American rhetoric. In March 
1959 Cuba seized control of the Cuban Telephone Company, an
^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence 
Review 16, no. 2 (February 1961): 72.
u.
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affiliate of the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation. In April 1959 Rail Castro claimed that the 
United States was an "enemy of the revolution." Later, in 
June 1959, Guevara travelled to Egypt and India for the 
purpose of aligning Cuba with other neutral nations. During 
the trip Guevara continually made speeches denouncing the 
United States for its historic oppression of the Cuban 
people and continued imperialistic intentions as exhibited 
by the American naval presence at the Guantanamo Naval
_ 23Base.
Fear grew throughout Latin America of the possible 
spread of Castro's revolution. In his January visit to 
Venezuela Castro asked President Romulo Betancourt to 
support his efforts to "liberate" Puerto Rico from the grasp 
of the United States. Castro failed to win the support of 
Betancourt. Castro later blasted both Venezuela and Costa 
Rica for failing to support his opposition to the American 
presence in the Caribbean.24 Cuban-sponsored insurrection 
surfaced throughout the region after Castro failed to 
receive support from other Latin American leaders. 
Revolutionaries sponsored by Cuba launched unsuccessful
^Ibid., 73.
24Higgins, 43.
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invasions in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.96
Washington grew concerned about Castro's obvious 
leanings toward communism. Following the' recognition of the 
communist party in Cuba, Castro sent Guevara to Moscow as 
Cuba's representative to the 2isc Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party. While in Moscow Guevara credited the 
communists in Cuba with ousting Batista and continuing the 
fight against American interference in Cuban affairs. In 
February Castro denounced the United States and reported 
that Cuba would not side with the United States in its 
confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In 
that same month Castro postponed promised elections until 
1961. In a briefing at the White House on 26 March 1959, 
Allen Dulles warned Eisenhower that Cuba was evolving into a 
communist state under the leadership of Castro. The 
communists did not control the government, but their 
influence in the military, labor unions, and police forces 
grew.26
In April 1959 Castro visited the United States to 
speak to the United Nations. Eisenhower originally 
considered denying Castro a visa but was advised against 
that course of action. But the President adamantly refused
^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence 
Review 16,
no. 2 (February 1961): 73.
^Eisenhower, 522-23.
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to see Castro. Instead, he directed Vice President Nixon to 
see him. The result was a three-hour conversation which 
convinced Nixon that Castro was a communist. In a briefing 
given to Eisenhower following his conversation with Castro 
Nixon stated, "[Castro] looked like a revolutionary, talked 
like an idealistic college professor and reacted like a 
communist." Nixon concluded, "Castro is either incredibly 
naive about communism or is under communist discipline."27 
As a result of his conversation with Castro, Nixon was one 
of the first advocates of training Cuban guerrillas in exile 
towards the ultimate goal of ousting Castro.28
Castro continued his anti-American rhetoric and 
consolidation of power through the use of intimidation and 
executions into early 1960. The Eisenhower Administration 
grew more perturbed with the Cuban situation. Particularly 
bothersome were Castro's continual attacks towards the 
United States while it continued to subsidize Cuban goods. 
Following his seizure of power Castro's depleted treasury 
received an advance of §15 million in subsidies from 
American oil companies. Even with United States government 
support and oil company subsidies, Castro nationalized
^Richard M. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro and JFK: Reflections
on U.S. Foreign Policy," Reader's Digest. November 1964,
284.
^Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and
Realities (New York: Praeger, 1962), 62-64.
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American-owned businesses.29 The problem of coping with the 
nationalization of American-owned businesses plagued the 
Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower whs in a diplomatic 
and political dilemma. It was difficult to tolerate 
American interests being trampled by Castro, but stiff 
policies might push Cuba closer, if not into, the Soviet 
Union's open arms. If American actions were viewed as too 
stringent by some Latin American leaders Eisenhower might 
jeopardize years of good will. In order to maintain solid 
Latin American support for the United States' policies in 
the region, he decided to maintain a policy of toleration 
towards Castro. In January 1960, though, in a show of 
growing weariness of Cuba, Washington recalled Ambassador 
Phillip Bonsai from Havana for consultations. Eisenhower 
did not wish to break ties with Cuba. He stressed the need 
to work within the framework of the OAS to isolate Cuba. If 
Castro failed to cooperate, Eisenhower favored a 
multilateral blockade of Cuba coordinated by the OAS. The 
pressure of a blockade, he hoped, would turn the populace 
against Castro or force him to work with the OAS. The 
intent would be to "starve" the population into getting rid 
of Castro.30
^Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968), 185-87.
30 . •Higgins, 48.
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American corporations with interests in Cuba fueled 
the fire for stiffer economic measures against Castro.
After being pressured by Secretary of the Treasury Robert 
Anderson, several American-owned petroleum refineries 
refused to refine 300,000 barrels of Soviet crude oil. In 
response, the Cuban government directed Esso, Texaco, and 
Shell to provide plans for the refining of the Soviet oil or 
risk Cuban take-over. On 29 June 1960, following the 
petroleum companies' refusal to refine the Soviet oil, the 
Cuban government seized the Texaco refinery and two barges 
of Soviet oil were pulled into the refinery. The Esso and 
Shell refineries were seized the next day by members of the 
Cuban worker's militia.31 In retaliation, Secretary of 
State Herter urged the House Committee on Agriculture to 
revoke the sugar quota. On 5 July 1960 Congress approved 
the measure granting the President the power to cut the 
sugar quota. Eisenhower signed the bill the next day. The 
quota called for the cutting of 700,000 tons in 1960.
Further cuts reduced the sugar quota entirely by 1961.32
Without any more stringent measures, Eisenhower's 
options were limited. The Soviet Union and other eastern- 
bloc nations supplanted the cutback of American economic
31"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence 
Review 16, no. 3 (March 1961): 112-13.
^Ibid., 114; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the
Hero. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 818.
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subsidies to Cuba. Cordial economic relations between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba had been established in February 1960. 
In a visit to Havana Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I.
Mikoyan signed an agreement calling for the normalization of 
relations between the two countries. In addition, the 
Soviet Union agreed to a trade and credit deal and also 
agreed to furnish Soviet technicians. After the Soviet- 
Cuban trade agreement was signed, Czechoslovakia established 
a $60 million line of credit for the purchase of jet 
aircraft, tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, and small arms.33 
In May 1960 the first Soviet advisers arrived in Havana. 
Further Cuban dealings with other communist nations included 
the exchange of students with China. Castro's direct 
involvement with ccmmunist-bloc nations aggravated an 
already sensitive American position towards Cuba.34
Castro's growing dominance proved that something more 
stringent than economic measures was necessary. It was 
difficult, though, for Eisenhower to rally American support 
against Castro because he posed no truly imminent threat to 
American interests. As Castro's ties to Moscow grew, it was 
evident to the President that "something had to be done."35
•“"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence 
Review 16, no. 2 (February 1961): 80.
^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence 
Review 16, no. 3 (March 1961): 111-14.
^Eisenhower, 524-25.
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The random executions of Castro's opposition, the 
nationalization of American-owned businesses, and finally 
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major Cuban ally 
forced Washington to reassess its policies towards Cuba. A 
political and strategic threat slowly emerging ninety miles 
off the southern coast of the United States.
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CHAPTER TWO 
17 MARCH 1960: THE WHEELS TURN
Clandestine operations in the Central Intelligence 
Agency [CIA] had a way of running on their own during the 
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations with little outside 
interference. The CIA was constantly involved in non-stop, 
secret wars against perceived communist forces. Since 1948 
the CIA had kept leftist forces throughout the world off- 
balance on more than one occasion. The CIA's operations in 
Greece in 1948, the Philippines in 1952-1953, Iran in 1953, 
and Guatemala in 1954 were successful and kept American 
involvement low keyed. The agency had experience and the 
requisite knowledge to conduct successful operations. The 
Cuban situation provided the CIA with a sizable challenge.1
The "5412 Committee" was established as an adjunct to 
the National Security Council to discuss CIA covert 
operations and other intelligence matters which affected 
national security. The committee consisted of the Deputy 
Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
the Director of the CIA, and the National Security Adviser.
1Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "The Confessions of Allen 
Dulles, New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs," Diplomatic History 
8, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 371-72.
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Its mission was to review, discuss, and approve the CIA's 
covert plans. On 17 March 1960, the "5412 Committee" met 
with the President, members of the White-House Staff, State 
Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] in the White 
House. In attendance were Vice President Nixon, Secretary 
of State Herter, Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston 
Merchant, Roy Rubottom, John Irwin, Admiral Burke, Deputy 
Director of the CIA Richard Bissell, Secretary of the 
Treasury Anderson, and General Andrew Goodpaster.2 The 
discussions concerned the various measures available to the 
President to handle the Cuban situation. The general 
consensus of the meeting was that the situation had gotten 
out of hand. Eisenhower felt particularly perturbed that a 
communist regime so close to the United States was "thumbing 
its nose" at the United States.3 Castro had become an 
oppressive dictator under the influence of the Soviet Union 
and China. There was no chance of democracy emerging in 
Cuba so long as Castro remained in power. Individual 
freedoms needed to be restored and Sino-Soviet influence
^cGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum of Meeting with the 
President, 17 March 1960," Papers of the Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs, Meetings with the President, 
Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, 1960 file, 
vol. 2 (2), box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, 
Kansas.
3Stephen Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the
Espionage Establishment (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981),
303.
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eliminated. A realistic agrarian reform program needed to 
be established.4 With Castro in power oppression would 
continue, but most important, the United- States was faced 
with a strategic and political dilemma as Soviet influence 
in the region grew.
At the conclusion of the meeting Eisenhower directed 
Dulles and the CIA to develop a plan to replace the Castro 
regime with one more "devoted to the true interests of the 
Cuban people" and more acceptable to the interests of the 
United States. No overt American involvement was allowed. 
Eisenhower authorized support and direction for rebels 
inside and outside Cuba. The President approved four 
courses of action:
1. Creation of an exile group opposed to Castro,
2. Development of a means to spread propaganda 
throughout Cuba,
3. Creation of a covert intelligence network inside
Cuba,
4. Development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba. 
The fourth course of action consisted of two phases. The 
first phase consisted of recruiting and training leaders of 
the movement. These leaders would be trained as 
paramilitary instructors. The second phase consisted of the
4Dwight D. Eisenhower, Personal Papers, Post 
Presidential Series, Palm Desert, California, Cuba file, box
10, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
L.
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rebel paramilitary leaders training other Cuban exiles for 
eventual insertion into Cuba to conduct guerrilla operations 
against the Castro regime.5
Eisenhower wanted an operation similar to the one 
conducted in Guatemala in 1954. On 18 June 1954 two hundred 
revolutionaries sponsored by the CIA crossed the Honduran 
border into Guatemala. These troops received air cover from 
three P-47 fighter planes and a pair of Cessnas. During the 
"invasion" a radio barrage of propaganda was broadcast from 
Swan Island in the Caribbean. The CIA hoped that there 
would be a general uprising against the Arbenz regime during 
the invasion. The light bombing throughout Guatemala, 
coupled with jamming of local radio stations and misleading 
information broadcast from Swan Island, finally provoked a 
revolt within the Guatemalan military against the 
government. Arbenz was deposed and Castillo Armas, 
supported by the CIA, was installed in power.6 The planner 
of the Guatemalan operation, Richard Bissell, felt that the 
probability of success in Cuba was dependent on Castro 
falling to the same kind of pressure put on Arbenz. Bissell
sGeneral Maxwell Taylor, "Taylor Committee Report and 
Memorandum for the Record of Paramilitary Study Group 
Meetings, Part III," Annex 1, John F. Kennedy Library, 
Boston, Massachusetts, p. 1. Hereafter cited as "Taylor 
Reports.1
6Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy.
Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1987), 30-34.
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based his strategy on "a protracted period of psychological
and political warfare." Bissell didn't think that Castro
would resist:
The chance of true success— that is the chance of 
toppling Castro— was predicated on the assumption 
that, faced with that kind of pressure, he would 
suffer the same loss of nerve [as Arbenz].7
Eisenhower approved the development of a plan to
topple Castro in March 1960. The plan called for the
training of twenty guerrilla leaders. Training sites were
established at the U.S. Army Jungle Warfare School at Fort
Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The other training
location was at Retalheu, Guatemala. The guerrilla leaders
were to receive training in tactics, infiltration, methods
of strengthening and "knitting up" the suppose active
guerrilla resistance in Cuba. After initial training this
group were to train seventy-five other exiles with an
ultimate objective of three hundred additional recruits.
The final aspects of training were to prepare the guerrillas
for eventual infiltration into Cuba and building a network
of guerrilla resistance with logistical support from the
United States.8
7Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The
Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press, 1982), 194-95.
Richard Bissell, Interview by Ed Edwin, 5 June 1967, 
Oral History Research Office, Butler Library, Columbia 
University, New York, 29; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept 
the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1979), 112.
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On 18 August 1960 Bissell briefed the President on the 
status of the operation. A communications site consisting 
of a 50 kilowatt radio station was established on Swan 
Island in the central Caribbean. It began broadcasting on 
18 May 1960. Bissell advised Eisenhower that training was 
progressing but additional funds and Department of Defense 
[DoD] support was needed. Eisenhower approved a budget 
increase of $13 million as well as the use of DoD personnel 
and equipment for training in Guatemala. Eisenhower 
stressed that no U.S. troops would be used in a combat 
status.9
The JCS were informed of the plan well after the 
wheels started turning. The JCS and Navy were intentionally 
left out of the planning and development phases in order to 
protect the security of the operation. The CIA went ahead 
with the training in Central America, arranged the purchase 
of antiquated World War II amphibious landing craft and 
ships (LCIs and LSDs), and recruited additional exiles to 
conduct the mission. Even though DoD personnel and 
equipment were brought into operation as early as August 
1960, the JCS never officially received briefings on the 
operation until October. General Lyman Lemnitzer, USA, 
Chairman of the JCS, was briefed on the plan only after the 
President asked Dulles to give a briefing on the status of
9Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 2.
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the Cuban operation during a White House meeting. Admiral 
Burke and Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Jr., Commander in 
Chief, Atlantic, [CINCLANT], gained information of the 
operation through Naval Intelligence sources in Guatemala 
and Nicaragua. In its initial phases neither the JCS nor 
the Navy received a detailed briefing of the operation.
They were not allowed to participate in the planning or 
logistical coordination of the plan. It was a CIA matter. 
Security was paramount. The JCS could not discuss the 
operation with anyone, not even their immediate staffs.10 
As the operation grew, the security issue would become a 
greater burden for the Navy in its attempts to prepare for 
any contingencies that might require the use of American 
naval forces to assist in the conduct of the mission.
By late October 1960 problems continued to grow in the 
operation and the CIA was forced to change plans. Scheduled 
commitments were not met because the CIA encountered 
difficulty creating a unified opposition to Castro. Swan 
Island sporadically broadcast propaganda. To compound 
matters the underground in Cuba was overrated and 
unorganized. Security was so lax that it was fairly easy 
for Castro to round up suspected guerrillas. Castro 
isolated remaining guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains and
10Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and 
His Joint Chiefs of Staff" (Ph.D. diss., University of South 
Carolina, 1981), 180-86.
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literally starved them out. On 31 October the CIA 
recommended that the scope of the operation be changed 
because of the growing problems. In a cable from CIA 
Headquarters in Washington to the Senior Project 
Representative in Retalheu the CIA alerted its agents that 
changes in the operation were forthcoming. In the change 
proposed to the White House the CIA recommended that the 
operation shift from guerrilla infiltrations to a 
conventional amphibious landing and airborne assault. 
Consequently the emphasis in training shifted from guerrilla 
warfare and infiltration tactics to conventional assault 
consisting of squad, platoon, and company regimented 
training. The cable to Retalheu concluded that a 
possibility existed that the revolutionary forces would 
receive U.S. Army special forces training and support.11 On 
4 November Eisenhower authorized changing the format of the 
operation to a conventional assault. The size of the 
revolutionary force grew from the original 20 guerrilla 
leaders to approximately 600 to 750 exiles in training. The 
operation now included a preliminary air strike launched 
from Nicaragua to wipe out Castro's air force and other 
military targets. After the amphibious landing, air strikes 
and logistical flights to the beachhead would continue. The 
invading force would have to secure the beachhead, maintain
11 Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 4.
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a visible presence, and then draw a sizable number of 
dissidents from the military and civilian populace for 
support of the landing force. These defections would 
trigger a popular uprising against the Castro regime.12 
Following the uprising a provisional government made up of 
Cuban exiles recruited by the CIA would be established on 
the beachhead.
A major decision to shift the nature of the operation 
from guerrilla infiltrations to full scale amphibious 
landings should have been reviewed and if necessary modified 
by the nation's military chiefs. All review and 
modifications continued to be made by the CIA alone with no 
outside assistance. In order to ease training and 
coordination with the military, the JCS temporarily assigned 
Marine Corps Colonels Jack Hawkins and Stanley Beerli to 
coordinate the military training of the ground and air 
forces. If the CIA had interpreted this as an indication of 
a joint CIA-JCS cooperation, it was in error.13 The Joint 
Chiefs' action was taken to assist another government agency 
conduct an operation, not to take part in it.
The small-scale guerrilla assault force escalated by 
December 1960 into a full-scale amphibious landing force 
consisting of the Cuban Expeditionary Force [CEF]. The
12Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 3-5.
13John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 360.
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training of the expeditionary force spread throughout the 
United States, Central America, and the Caribbean. The tank 
forces received training at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The 
guerrilla forces were trained at Belle Chaise, Louisiana, 
and the Panama Canal Zone. Key West, Florida, was the 
logistical center for the force. The maritime forces were 
trained at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Twelve American 
pilots were recruited from the Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Virginia Air National Guard. These pilots participated in 
formation flying and gunnery exercises with Cuban exile 
pilots at Retalheu. The staging area for the operation was 
at Puerto Cabezas on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua.14
In Washington skepticism grew as a result of the shift 
to a full-scale amphibious assault. General Robert E. 
Cushman, Jr., Vice President Nixon's executive assistant for 
national security affairs, called the operation pretty 
"hairy." He mentioned that if the invasion failed, the U.S. 
should be ready to put Marines on the beach. Realistically, 
Cushman admitted that the invasion was so big that it was 
going to be nearly impossible to avoid linking the United 
States to the operation.15 Neither Secretary of Defense 
Thomas Gates nor Undersecretary of State James Douglas felt
14Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red:
The Storv of the Secret War against Castro (New York:
Harper & Row, 1981), 65-66.
15Higgins, 63-64.
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comfortable with the operation. Gates called the 
expeditionary forces wholly inadequate. Douglas wanted to 
disassociate the DoD from the final approval of the 
operation.16
In November 1961 John F. Kennedy was elected 
President. Director of the CIA Allen Dulles briefed the new 
President on the Cuban situation on 17 and 29 November. 
Kennedy was impressed with the operation and told Dulles to 
carry on. There was little advice or direction given by 
either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration following 
Dulles' briefings. In the weeks following the election the 
government "floated in a void." Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
a member of Kennedy's inner circle of advisers, claimed that 
decisions were not made because neither camp wanted to make 
them. As a result, existing plans carried on as planned. 
Kennedy approved of the operation in general but warned 
planners to be ready for a review and discussion following 
the inauguration.17 Failure of either administration to act 
allowed the operation to gather greater momentum. More and 
more money and time were spent on the training of the 
expeditionary force.
16Peter Wyden, Bay of Pias: The Untold Storv (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 72.
17Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Davs (New 
York: Greenwich House, 1965), 233-34.
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The CIA was in a difficult position. Little, if any, 
direction came from the White House before the inauguration, 
but pressure from outside the United States began to grow. 
President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, who earlier 
had granted the CIA permission to use a military base for 
training outside Retalheu, faced growing opposition to the 
training of the Cuban exiles. In December 1960 he told the 
CIA that the time was coming when the force would have to 
move out of Guatemala. The CIA seriously considered 
airlifting the expeditionary force to a small island in the 
Pacific. The CIA was becoming desperate about the security 
of the operation. The State Department objected to moving 
the entire force to the United States. By the turn of the 
new year the size of the force reached between 800 and 900 
revolutionary exiles.18 That number eventually grew to over 
1400 soldiers. The exile group consisted of a mix of 
farmers, fisherman, lawyers, doctors, and bankers. The 
group was formed into a brigade of soldiers ready for battle 
in little less than a year.13 On 3 January 1961 Eisenhower 
warned Kennedy that if the operation had any chance of 
success the incoming administration would have to act 
quickly. Castro's militia was growing in strength daily. 
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann informed Kennedy
18Bissell, 31-32.
19Mario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Reader's Digest. 
September 1964, 258-59.
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that of the two hundred thousand members of Castro's 
militia, approximately 10 per cent were ready to fight for 
Castro and the number was increasing. Mann also stressed 
his opinion that U.S. military support was necessary for the 
operation to succeed.20 Kennedy listened to the briefs and 
deferred any decision until after the inauguration.
Another change in the plans took place in January 
1961. The scope of the operation shifted from an amphibious 
landing and airborne assault to an operation consisting of a 
guerrilla strikes inside Cuba coinciding with the landings 
and air strikes. The Cuban expeditionary air force included 
B-26 bombers. The CIA chose B-26s in order to avoid the 
American government being associated with the operation.
The B-26s were common warplanes in that region.
The increase in the magnitude of the operation was due 
to the changing environment in Cuba. In late November 
Castro partially mobilized the civilian militia in addition 
to his regular army forces in preparation for the imminent 
invasion. CIA-sponsored air drops to rebels inside Cuba 
became more and more ineffective as Castro continued to 
round up suspected guerrillas. The growing number of arms 
supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union and Eastern-Bloc 
nations gave Castro a formidable force.21 The numbers of
^Higgins, 72.
21Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum l, p. 3.
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exiles participating in the operation had to increase to 
ensure any probability of success. Neutralization of 
Castro's air force, tanks, and artillery emplacements was 
essential.
While the training of the brigade continued, relations 
between the United States and Cuba worsened. On 2 January 
1961 Castro gave the American Embassy in Havana forty-eight 
hours to reduce the size of its diplomatic mission to a 
level on a par with the Cuban mission in Washington. In a 
meeting at the White House on 3 January, Eisenhower 
discussed breaking relations with Cuba. The President was 
tired of America "being kicked around" and warned that if 
any Americans in Cuba were hurt, he would not hesitate to 
send in the Marines. During the meeting Dulles advised 
Eisenhower that the paramilitary force training in Guatemala 
was the best military force in Central America and the time 
was right for launching the invasion. Support for Castro 
among Cuba's white collar workers eroded. Based on CIA's 
intelligence estimates, Castro's overall popularity rating 
in Cuba dropped from a 95 percent support level following 
his seizure of power to 25 to 33 percent.22 After the U.S. 
broke relations with Cuba on 4 January 1961, Eisenhower 
directed Herter to brief in-coming Secretary of State Dean
^cGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum of the Meeting with the 
President, 3 January 1961," Box 35, Country Series, Cuba, 
General, vol. I, 1/61-4/61, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 
Massachusetts.
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Rusk and see if Kennedy wanted to join in a united 
resolution concerning the Cuban situation. Rusk responded 
that in the absence of complete information on the entire 
situation, the Kennedy Administration elected to refrain 
from entering into a joint resolution.23 In the meantime 
Eisenhower's advisers recommended intervention against 
Castro. Time was on the side of Castro. Admiral Burke and 
the JCS were ardent proponents of the use of military force 
against Cuba. The Joint Chiefs favored the immediate 
overthrow of Castro but did not support the original CIA 
plan. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM) 44-61, "U.S. 
Plan of Action in Cuba," discussed the various options 
available to overthrow Castro. The plan recommended that 
the military devise and implement a plan of attack based on 
the use of Cuban revolutionaries with covert U.S. military 
support. Although similar to the original CIA concept, JCSM 
44-61 provided alternatives in ascending order of magnitude 
and involvement to accomplish the mission:
1. Pressure— the U.S. pressures Cuba with economic 
sanctions, including embargoes, breaks diplomatic relations, 
encourages the use of the Organization of American States 
[OAS] to isolate Cuba, continue propaganda efforts, and 
continue naval and aerial surveillance. The Navy would 
provide the show of force during surveillance and naval
^James Reston, "Kennedy Avoids Role in Decision," New 
York Times. 4 January 1961, 1.
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maneuvers off the coast of Cuba.
2. Internal Uprising— the U.S. would foster internal 
dissent and civil unrest through propaganda broadcasts, air 
drops of leaflets, and press releases. The military would 
provide whatever logistical support was necessary to assist 
the operation.
3. Volunteer Invasion Force with Covert American 
support— the U.S. would train and support a group of exiles 
in preparation for an invasion of Cuba. Again, the military 
would provide the logistical support.
4. Guerrilla Support with Covert Support— the U.S. 
would train guerrillas for insertion into Cuba to start 
guerrilla activities with covert U.S. military support.
5. Volunteer Invasion Force with Overt Action— the 
U.S. would train guerrilla forces to be inserted in Cuba to 
start guerrilla activities with direct U.S. military 
participation. In this course of action the Navy would 
provide a naval blockade.
6. Overt U.S. Action Supported by Latin American 
Volunteers— the U.S. military would invade with assistance 
from revolutionary volunteers. The invasion would be 
supported by a naval blockade.
7. Unilateral Overt U.S. Action— the U.S. military 
would invade with no assistance from outside forces. A 
naval blockade would coincide with the invasion.
The main emphasis of JCSM 44-61 was to propose the ascending
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degrees of military involvement available depending on the 
success or failure of the initial actions. In conclusion, 
the JCS recommended the development of an interdepartmental 
group to review the various options available to the 
Administration.24 Eisenhower deferred a decision on the 
invasion to the incoming administration.
Kennedy was inaugurated on 20 January 1961. During 
his campaign he had promised a more successful policy 
towards Cuba. He harshly criticized the Republican Party 
for allowing Cuba to go communist. Kennedy promised not to 
remain passive towards Castro and was committed to helping 
the Cuban opposition eliminate Castro. Kennedy was 
impressed by the dedication of the exiles and the 
preparations already underway for invading Cuba. The CIA's 
plan was in accord with his own personal thinking.25 
Kennedy felt that the shift in Cuba towards communism was 
like "seeing a treasured childhood retreat decay into a 
tawdry slumdom overrun by rowdy toughs."26
On 28 January 1961 Kennedy held his first cabinet 
meeting to discuss the CIA's plan. During the meeting 
Dulles informed Kennedy that Cuba was totally dominated by
24Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 7, pp. 6-7.
^Philip Bonsai, Cuba. Castro, and the United States 
(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 181-82.
^David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis. 1962
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979), 32.
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the communists and Castro was increasing the country's 
military power and influence in the region. Dulles claimed 
that while Castro was increasing his foundation of power, 
popular discontent was flourishing. A growing opposition 
movement to Castro was developing inside Cuba. Several 
covert operations were already in motion, such as propaganda 
broadcasts from Swan Island, sabotage of the Cuban sugar 
industry, and CIA-sponsored guerrilla attacks against 
Castro's strongholds. New Secretary of Defense McNamara 
countered Dulles' optimistic view of the situation by 
warning the President that no plan currently in place for 
the removal of Castro would succeed. Secretary of State 
Rusk echoed McNamara's sentiments. Rusk warned the 
President of the possible implications of covert action 
conducted without the support of the OAS. Kennedy 
authorized continuation of the plan and accentuation of 
propaganda efforts, political isolation of Castro, and 
sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry. He also directed the 
CIA and the JCS to review the proposals in their respective 
fields for the use of Cuban exile forces to overthrow 
Castro.27
In response to the President's directives of 28 
January the JCS submitted Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 
[JCSM] 57-61, "The Military Evaluation of the CIA
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 8.
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Paramilitary Plan, Cuba." The Joint Chiefs provided a 
thorough and concise evaluation of the military portion of 
the CIA's plan to overthrow Castro by an amphibious landing 
on the southern coast of Cuba near the town of Trinidad.
The plan that was reviewed by the JCS called for the 
operation to be conducted outside the town of Trinidad, an 
area with the ingredients necessary for a successful 
amphibious landing. The Amphibious Objective Area [AOA] was 
a semi-circle with a perimeter approximately eleven miles 
from Trinidad. A city was within the beachhead, as were an 
airfield, roads, a river, and an open bay. The perimeter 
was in low hill masses surrounded by large elevated hills, 
approximately seven hundred feet high. The overlooking 
hills provided adequate means for the defense of the 
beachhead. The area between the perimeter and the beachhead 
consisted of flat, heavily wooded land. Two good roads 
entered the AOA from the east and west with a railroad 
entering from the northeast. The area was suitable for the 
use of tanks and heavy mobile equipment.
The beachhead consisted of three small beaches, two at 
the mouth of the river and one on the west side of the bay. 
The sizes of the beaches varied from sixty to one hundred 
yards long with navigable waters. There were sufficient 
transit areas for small vehicles on the beaches. The air 
drop zone on the beach was approximately two thousand yards 
long on open, flat terrain. A key aspect of the plan was
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that the beachhead was remote. The access roads into the 
area were limited. The routes limited incoming traffic.
The rugged terrain facilitated the movement of guerrillas 
into the hills if the mission failed.
The invading force expected to encounter light 
resistance once the landing began. Each village and town in 
Cuba had a local militia unit. The size of the unit varied 
according to the size of the town. The units assembled on 
call from the police station. The police controlled the 
issue of weapons. The JCS suspected that the police 
controlled access to the weapons because Castro did not 
trust the militia to fight the guerrillas without turning on 
the government forces.28
According to the plan, on the day before the invasion 
(D -1), an air strike would be conducted against Cuban 
aircraft on the ground, naval patrol vessels, key 
communications facilities, radar sites, microwave 
facilities, tank and artillery positions at Managua, the 
highway and railroad bridges outside the beachhead, as well 
as other bridges. At approximately 2000 on D -1 a 
diversionary landing would be staged on the northwest coast 
of Cuba by two Underwater Demolition Teams [UDTs]. If the 
initial air strike failed, late on the night of D -1 
paratroops would be dropped into the beachhead to blow up
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 9, pp. 8-12.
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the three key bridges in the AOA.29
According to the plan, on the day of the invasion 
(D-Day) a U.S. Navy amphibious landing ship (LSD), with a 
well deck to carry landing craft (LCUs and LCVPs), would 
off-load the boats and personnel. Prior to dawn on D-Day 
the B-26s would conduct a second air strike against the 
beach, air strip, and any remaining targets left from the 
previous air strike. At dawn the task force would land by 
boat and parachute drops from air planes on the east and 
west beach. The beachhead would be secured by closing the 
access roads on the perimeter. If all went according to 
schedule, the AOA would be secured by nightfall. If the 
landings were successful, defections would be expected from 
the Cuban military and civilian populace. If the operation 
failed, the task force would have the capability of 
converting to guerrilla warfare tactics and heading for the 
jungles to join up with local guerrilla groups and continue 
operations from bases in the Escambray Mountains.30
It was imperative for the initial air strike to knock 
out the Cuban Air Force if the operation was going to 
succeed. Fourteen of the seventeen B-26s would be used for 
this purpose. The planes would be piloted by six American 
volunteer pilots and twelve Cuban exiles. The Cubans were
^Ibid., 20.
“ibid., 20-21.
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better at dive and skip bombing and at strafing than were 
the U.S. pilots. To ensure that mission objectives were 
met, American pilots would be used in each strike against 
Castro's air force. Each aircraft would be armed with two 
700 lb. napalm bombs, sixteen 220 lb. fragmentary bombs, 
plus eight .50 caliber machine guns with 2400 rounds of 
ammunition. All the flights would originate at Puerto 
Cabezas, Nicaragua, until the airstrip in the AOA was 
secured.
In its review of the plan, the JCS pointed out that a 
problem existed with the limited on-station time of the 
aircraft. The flight to Cuba from Puerto Cabezas was over 
two hours each way. If the aircraft carried napalm they 
could stay in the area only twenty minutes with one hour of 
fuel in reserve. Those aircraft not carrying napalm could 
stay in the area for approximately two hours with one hour 
of fuel in reserve. The limited on-station time meant that 
the initial air strikes had to be accurate and that there 
was little chance of repeat strikes if there were any enemy 
air opposition.31 The lack of on-station time lessened the 
probability of maintaining air superiority, and that would 
possibly create the need for American military assistance.
The Cuban Air Force, though limited, could provide 
formidable opposition if not eliminated or neutralized. The
31 Ibid., 22-23.
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Cuban air inventory included fourteen Sea Furies, three F- 
47s, one F-51, thirteen B-26s, six TBM-38S, fifteen 
transport type aircraft, and twenty-two helicopters.32 One 
fatal omission in the evaluation of the plan was the lack of 
information on Castro's T-33 trainer jet aircraft. This 
flaw would become apparent as the invasion progressed.
The evaluation by the JCS brought to light several 
problems that the expeditionary forces could expect during 
the invasion. Even though the air strike and parachute 
drops were intended to destroy the bridges in the beachhead, 
the brigade had no bridging or engineering capability to 
reconstruct the bridges and roads once the AOA was secured. 
The failure to include these units would ensure the landing 
force a secure beachhead with no possible escape except to 
the sea. The load-out of the brigade's ships included no 
flood-light trailers for night time off-loads on the beach. 
The manning of the force did not provide adequately trained 
or sufficiently numbered shore party personnel to handle 
heavy off-loading on the beach. The off-loading of the 
invading forces' ships was to be conducted by contract 
labor, not members of the brigade. This could pose a 
problem after the shooting started. The CIA did not take 
into account the difficulty of off-loading the ships into 
the LCUs. It was impractical and nearly impossible to load
“ibid., 7.
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trucks and heavy gear off ships to LCUs at sea. The JCS 
also found fault in the method of fuel replenishment for the 
tanks, trucks, and boats. The three thousand gallon 
refuelers were to be used for aviation fuel (AVGAS) at the 
air strip. Fuel for the boats, tanks, and trucks (MOGAS) 
used wobble pumps. Hand-pumping gasoline was time-consuming 
and dangerous in the dark. Night time refueling would 
require a lighting system, flood-light trucks and at least 
one crane. The JCS also concluded that the plan did not 
consider the problem of distributing supplies on the beach. 
The intent to have each platoon drawing supplies as it 
needed was impractical and encouraged pilfering. The plan 
also failed to consider repair and maintenance facilities or 
tank retrievers for broken-down tanks and trucks. The most 
important fault was the lack of provisions made for the 
evacuation of personnel and equipment.33
Although the flaws were numerous, the JCS did find 
some positive aspects to the plan. Based on CIA 
intelligence estimates the Joint Chiefs concluded that the 
landing would probably be unopposed. There would be little 
air opposition with plenty of friendly air support available 
if the Cuban Air Force was eliminated. The terrain was 
ideal for the defense of the AOA. Because of its proximity 
to the mountains and the anticipated network of guerrillas,
“ibid., 26-27.
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the invading force could expect local assistance during the 
invasion. The JCS felt that the high motivation and morale 
of the brigade would overcome any obstacles or difficulties 
encountered during the operation.34
In conclusion, the JCS felt that the plan had a "fair 
chance" of success. It was not an approval of the plan. To 
them success of the operation would be dependent on several 
factors. The operation would be dependent on local Cuban 
support which required constant observation of the internal 
situation in Cuba from Washington. Careful consideration 
had to be given to the airlifting of the brigade from 
Retalheu to the embarkation point at Puerto Cabezas. The 
movement might compromise the security of the operation. In 
view of the complexity of the loading and marshalling phases 
of the operation, the JCS recommended that the plan would 
need to be continually reviewed to ensure proper 
interdepartment coordination and command and control and to 
ensure that security would not be jeopardized. Surprise 
would be essential. The JCS felt that if CIA intelligence 
estimates of the Cuban air capability were sound and 
surprise were attained, the brigade would be large enough to 
make the plan succeed. The airborne assault should not be 
opposed, so it had a strong possibility of succeeding. The 
amphibious assault should be successful against marginal
^Ibid., 37.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
opposition, but logistical support was lacking. If the 
invading force ran into considerable opposition, the 
logistical support would then be totally inadequate. The 
scheme to secure the beachhead was sound but additional 
planning would be required for the control and utilization 
of indigenous facilities and personnel in a combat and 
support role. With no interference from expeditionary 
aircraft, assault troops, or guerrillas, Castro's forces 
could move substantial forces to the beachhead by D +2. It 
would take at least two days for the CEF to plan and launch 
a response to a Cuban counterattack. Since the Cuban army 
lacked experience in coordinated offensive actions, the 
invasion force should be able to successfully resist 
Castro's initial attacks. Even without local volunteers, a 
popular uprising, or the introduction of substantial follow- 
on forces, the JCS believed that the brigade had the 
capability to capture the beach.35
The Joint Chiefs' overall impression was that the 
operation would not require overt American military 
intervention. The report gave a favorable assessment 
tempered by the identification of deficiencies that needed 
to be addressed before the invasion began. The objectives 
were dependent on the degree of popular support and success 
of the political and psychological part of the plan rather
“ibid., 2.
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than on purely military factors. The JCS recommended that a 
team of Army, Navy, and Air Force observers be sent to 
Central America to assess the training and battle readiness 
of the forces.36 The JCS evaluation should have been viewed 
as a report that created more questions than answers. It 
should not have been viewed by some in the Kennedy 
Administration as a blanket military approval of the 
Trinidad Plan. The weakness in the JCS memorandum was that 
there was no clear signal sent to administration officials 
concerning the military's overall support or lack of support 
for the plan.
Even though the JCS gave a lukewarm endorsement to the 
Trinidad Plan, there was great concern about the 
effectiveness of a military plan drawn by civilians, run by 
civilians, and with little, if any, military support. Three 
JCS representatives went to Guatemala to evaluate the status 
of the training of the CEF. Their evaluation, JCSM 146-61, 
indicated an overall satisfaction with the training. The 
representatives stressed that in order to attain complete 
surprise, the brigade should be airlifted to the landing 
site. Airlifting the troops to Cuba instead of conducting 
an amphibious landing would serve two purposes. First, the 
entire force could be landed within one day of departure. 
Second, an air drop of paratroops had a greater probability
“ibid., 3, 38.
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of catching the Cubans off-guard. The JCS observers noted a 
problem that would affect the surprise and security of the 
operation. The mayor of Retalheu was a communist. A short 
wave radio transmitter operated in the city. The Communist 
Party dropped propaganda leaflets in Guatemala City 
describing the entire operation while the brigade trained in 
Retalheu. With a town dominated by communists one mile away 
from the training site, a railroad on one side of the camp, 
and a highway on the other, the air movement of the troops 
from Retalheu to Puerto Cabezas would almost certainly be 
noticed. The only thing Castro would not have known was 
when and where the forces were going to land.37
Based on their observations of the security conditions
at both Retalheu and Puerto Cabezas, the JCS representatives
concluded that the odds against achieving surprise during 
the invasion were as high as five to one. If surprise was 
not achieved, the group concluded that the air missions 
would fail.38 Even if surprise were accomplished, the 
chances of keeping American involvement out of sight would 
be minimal.
The CIA was operating under strict guidelines that 
there be no American military involvement, and American- 
sponsored activities needed to be minimized. The directives
37Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 10, pp. 8-12, 18.
MIbid, 8.
L .
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were extended to include no American support for the air 
strikes launched on D-Day.39 Kennedy faced a dilemma. Too 
little U.S. support for the operation would bring failure. 
Too much military involvement would show U.S. complicity in 
the operation. Yet, Kennedy wanted the operation to succeed 
with no U.S. involvement. JCS planners had a difficult time 
working under these guidelines. It would be difficult to 
deny American involvemert in an operation that large. The 
forces that the CIA built were as sizable as many armies in 
that region of the world. It was an army that lacked 
experienced military guidance and direction for such a 
complex operation.
Brigade 2506, the Cuban Expeditionary Force, had grown 
to 1442 Cuban exiles by January 1961. The task force 
consisted of 1004 personnel, organized as one infantry 
battalion of four rifle companies. One rifle company 
consisted of paratroopers. The battalion was armed with 
mortars, .77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon 
consisting of five M41 tanks. Other arms included pistols, 
M-l rifles, grenade launchers, submachine guns, .57 mm 
recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and rocket launchers. It 
was a formidable arsenal. The brigade's air force consisted 
of seventeen B-26s, ten C-54s, and five C-46s, supported by 
one hundred ground personnel and eighteen pilots. The vast
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum I, pp. 7-8.
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size of the brigade narrowed the CIA's options on the means 
of transporting the force to Cuba. Transporting a force 
this large by air would have been difficult. The only 
feasible option was to transport the brigade by ships. The 
brigade's maritime force consisted of seven World 
War II amphibious ships. CINCLANT provided a Navy dock 
landing ship (LSD) to transport the brigade's four utility 
craft (LCUs) and three personnel carriers (LCVPs). The 
brigade's landing ships and craft were purchased by the CIA 
early in the operation from American commercial shipping 
lines.40
As the training continued, uncertainty and doubt grew 
in the Kennedy Administration. During a briefing on 17 
February 1961 Secretary of State Rusk proposed that the 
operation be delayed so that the State Department could 
gather support from members of the OAS. Kennedy still 
wanted to resolve the Cuban problem through diplomatic 
channels. He was reluctant to commit the United States to a 
military operation when a political solution was still 
attainable. The guerrilla infiltration idea still appealed 
to Kennedy but he wanted to give the diplomats a chance 
solve the problem.41 The plan to land an amphibious force 
and hold the beachhead long enough to establish a
40Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 9, pp. 7-16.
41Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 16, p. 1.
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provisional government had its positive merits, but the 
administration did not want to be forced into a position of 
"political bankruptcy." Kennedy questioned how such a large 
operation could be stopped after all the time and training 
had been put into it. If Kennedy called it off, he would 
have a disposal problem consisting of the fifteen hundred 
members of the brigade. Latin American leaders were 
unwilling to take the brigade. If the brigade returned to 
the U.S., Kennedy might be accused of not supporting 
fighters of communism in the region. Kennedy was concerned 
about the political ramifications at home if he cancelled 
the mission. The Republicans, attacked by Kennedy during 
the election for being soft of communism, would have a 
political field day with his perceived lack of commitment 
toward fighting the communists. If the brigade were 
disbanded, it might encourage the further spread of Castro's 
revolution throughout the region. The contingency had 
become a necessity. The CIA created the brigade and was 
forced into a position of having to use it. Kennedy was 
uncertain of what action to take. Kennedy listened to his 
advisers' arguments and agreed with Dulles that maybe the 
best place for the Cuban exiles was in Cuba.42
On 11 March 1961 Kennedy met with the National 
Security Council in the White House to receive a status
^Schlesinger, 242.
k.
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report on the operation. Bissell submitted a summary of the 
CIA plan, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba." The summary 
included an overview of the operation and a report on the 
status of the training of the brigade. Bissell stated that 
the Trinidad Plan had a greater chance to succeed if a 
diversionary landing preceded the actual invasion. Once the 
beachhead was secured, the CIA would transport the
provisional government to the site. The exile government
would assume power and the United States would recognize it.
Bissell claimed that the strength of the force would
withstand Castro's initial counterattack and allow the 
beachhead to remain secure. Kennedy grew wary of the size 
of the operation. He directed the CIA to establish a less 
conspicuous plan, preferably a night landing, not like a 
World War II amphibious landing. On 13 March Bissell 
returned and presented three alternatives for landing sites:
1. The Preston area on the northern coast of Oriente 
Province.
2. The south coast of Las Villas Province between 
Trinidad and Cienfuegos.
3. The eastern Zapata region near Cochinos Bay, the 
Bay of Pigs.
Following discussions of each site, Kennedy directed the JCS 
to review each plan and make recommendations.43
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 9-11.
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In "An Evaluation of the Military Aspects of 
Alternative Concepts, CIA Paramilitary Plan, Cuba," JCSM 
166-61, the JCS reviewed the three proposed alternatives to 
the Trinidad Plan. The first alternative called for a 
diversionary landing on the night of D -1 followed by a 
night-time landing in the Preston area of Oriente Province 
on D-Day. The landings would be conducted without airborne 
landings or air strikes. Control of the beachhead would be 
accomplished by seizing four strong points surrounding the 
area. Local guerrillas would be contacted and an air strip 
cleared. The advantage of this alternative was that a night 
landing afforded a higher probability of surprise. The 
surrounding mountains provided ample cover for the invading 
force. The landing area was near the main seat of 
government and the Cubans in the area were opposed to 
Castro's rule. It also provided the best beachhead of the 
three alternatives. The major disadvantage was that B-26s 
could not land on the air strip, and without air cover the 
Cuban Air Force would destroy the landing force. Another 
disadvantage was the inexperience of the task force in 
conducting amphibious operations at night. A successful 
operation in this region was doubtful.
The second alternative called for an amphibious 
landing on the south coast of Las Villas Province. That 
operation consisted of night paratroop drops prior to the 
landing on D-Day to seize key points and the local pier.
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Following the seizure of the pier, ships would dock and off­
load. Units of the task force would move inland and seize 
an air field and other strategic points, and establish 
communications with the airborne company. The objective 
area consisted of rolling hills backed by swamps. The area 
would provide ideal protection and concealment for the 
brigade. The advantage was that the beachhead was so 
isolated that it would be easy to secure. The Joint Chiefs 
concluded, however, that the disadvantages of this option 
outweighed the advantages. Surprise might not be achieved 
due to the presence of a local company of Cuban regulars.
The air strip had limited capabilities and was too far from 
the seat of government. The only escape was by sea. The 
mountains were over ten miles away. It would be difficult 
to support logistically because of its isolated location. 
Like the first alternative, a landing in Las Villas Province 
had little chance of success.
The third alternative was landing in the eastern 
Zapata region in the Bahia de Cochinos, or Bay of Pigs.
This plan called for a D -2 air strike of all Cuban air 
fields, communication centers, bridges, strategic road 
junctions, and tank and artillery emplacements. The plan 
was almost identical to the Trinidad Plan except for the 
location of the landing. A dawn invasion would be supported 
by another air strike in conjunction with air drops. The 
beachhead could be easily secured. On one side of the bay
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were swamps. On the other side of the bay were three good 
beaches surrounded by heavily wooded jungles. An air strip 
was nearby and capable of handling B-26s and large transport 
planes. The site was away from any sizable town or military 
detachment.44 Although still favoring the original Trinidad 
Plan, the JCS felt that the Zapata Plan had the highest 
probability of succeeding, although the plan was no less 
conspicuous than the Trinidad Plan. The operation had 
perhaps a 50 percent chance of succeeding. The JCS were not 
unified in their support of either the Trinidad or Zapata 
Plan. The Joint Chiefs reviewed the alternatives and made 
their recommendations based on the information provided by 
the CIA. The JCS based their recommendation on which 
alternative had the highest probability of succeeding, not 
on whether the plans would work. Kennedy approved the 
Zapata plan on 16 March and retained the power to call off 
the operation at any time.45
Some senior administration officials objected to the 
entire operation. Assistant Secretary of State Chester 
Bowles vehemently opposed the operation. The plan violated 
the charter of the OAS in which no member of the 
organization could use coercive, forceful actions upon 
another member of the organization. An American-sponsored
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 12, pp. 1-2.
biggins, 98-99.
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attack would be in direct violation of this charter. Bowles 
felt that the American chances of success were limited. If 
the operation failed, Castro's prestige in the region would 
grow. He would solidify his position and receive greater 
support from the Soviet Union. Even if successful, tbc 
operation would have an adverse effect on world opinion.
The possible gains were not worth the risks.46
Kennedy also heard arguments against the operation 
from within his own inner circle of advisers. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, warned the 
President that the Bay of Pigs was his first major foreign 
policy decision. It would easily wipe out the good will 
created by years of work. The possible negative diplomatic 
repercussions should be considered prior to making a final 
decision.47
Some on Capitol Hill knowledgeable about the plan 
opposed the invasion. Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark) was 
concerned. He thought that Kennedy had two options: 
overthrow Castro, or tolerate his abuses and try to isolate 
him. Fulbright did not favor the first option. It would 
violate the charter of the OAS and was contrary to American 
law. If the overthrow were successful, the U.S. would be 
burdened with maintaining support of a post-Castro
^Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep; Mv Years in Public 
Life. 1921-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 327-28.
47Schlesinger, 240.
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government. If that government were falling, the U.S. would 
be forced to intervene unilaterally to prop it up.
Fulbright's opposition grew the more he was informed of the 
operation:
To give this activity even covert support is of a 
piece with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which 
the U.S. is constantly denouncing the Soviet 
Union in the United Nations and elsewhere. This 
point will not be lost on the rest of the world—  
nor on our own consciences.48
Fulbright favored isolation of Castro. The Alliance for
Progress would be the perfect vehicle for ostracizing Castro
among Latin American leaders. Fulbright succinctly stated
that "the Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is
not a dagger m  the heart."
Even in the JCS there were vocal opponents to the
operation. General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, an expert of amphibious operations, was the only
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed to the
operation. He disliked foreign interventions. In a
briefing to senior administration officials Shoup asked, "Do
any of you gentlemen know how big Cuba is?" While he waited
for an answer, he proceeded to place an overlay of Cuba on a
map of the U.S. Cuba stretched from Washington, D.C. to
Chicago, nearly eight hundred miles. He then placed another
overlay with a red dot on it over Cuba. He then stated to
^Schiesinger, 251.
49Ibid.
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the officials, "That, gentlemen, represents the size of the 
island of Tarawa and it took us three days and eighteen 
thousand Marines to take it."50
A decision had to be made, but only the President 
could make it. The JCS felt that it was necessary to remove 
Castro from power, but the Zapata Plan did not meet their 
desires. There were too many weaknesses. Only direct 
military involvement would save the operation. The 
President was unwilling to go that far. The CIA stressed 
that the operation had gained so much momentum that it would 
be difficult to cancel. The pressure of having to act 
forced the President into having to approve a plan about 
which he did not feel comfortable. It was a decision that 
Kennedy wanted to avoid.
^Ranelagh, 364.
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CHAPTER THREE 
A POOR PLAN POORLY EXECUTED
Prior to the development of the Bay of Pigs operation, 
the Navy established a series of contingencies in the 
Caribbean. The emergence of the Soviet Union as Cuba's 
dominant ally created critical strategic problems for 
American naval planners. Once Castro opened his ports to 
Moscow and other eastem-bloc nations in I960, the perceived 
threat of Soviet submarines and surface ships in the 
Atlantic Ocean now extended to the Caribbean Sea. It is 
understandable that the Navy, in a strategic sense, favored 
the removal of Castro. A friendly neighbor in the Caribbean 
reduced the need for strategic planners to concentrate 
forces in that region. American force planners had to 
contend with a possible hostile neighbor on their southern 
front. U.S. submarine, air, and surface assets would have 
to be pulled away from the primary threat region in the 
Atlantic.
The Navy stepped up its activity in the Caribbean in 
response to the perceived threat from Cuba. A standing 
Caribbean naval force was created consisting of a destroyer 
squadron and a Marine Amphibious Ready Group homeported in 
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. An exercise consisting of an
67
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amphibious landing and naval gunfire was conducted in March 
1961 on Vieques Island, off the southeast tip of Puerto 
Rico. Anti-submarine warfare exercises were conducted in 
the Key West Operations Area using submarines from Submarine 
Squadron Twelve.
Although directed not tc become involved in the 
planning of the Bay of Pigs operation, the Navy did play a 
major logistical role in the establishment of the Swan 
Island communication site. The CIA's Swan Island operation, 
code named "Operation Crosspatch," depended heavily on the 
support of the Navy. Navy equipment and personnel were used 
to help construct the radio station and airstrip on the 
island. The CIA originally intended that the Swan Island 
project be considered a clandestine operation. But the Navy 
objected and asked that it be made into a "commercial" 
station partly because of the Navy's role in establishing 
it, but also because it would be difficult to remain 
"clandestine" when the Cubans possessed radio direction 
finding equipment capable of tracing the location of the 
site.1 The CIA consented ard asked for an additional Navy 
destroyer squadron to provide protection for Swan Island.
The Navy agreed to provide a few minesweepers.2
1Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 2, p. 1.
2Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Jr., USN (Ret), Interview 
by Dr. John P. Mason, Jr., August 1975, Oral History 
Collection, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 
Maryland, 330-31.
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Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Commander in Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet, [CINCLANT], was aware that the Caribbean 
situation was heating up following the construction of the 
Swan Island communication site. Like Admiral Burke,
Dennison never received initial briefings on the training or 
invasion aspects of the operation. He first heard that 
something was awry in November 1960. Vice Admiral G. C. 
Towner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet 
[PHIBLANT], told Dennison that the commanding officer of the 
USS SAN MARCOS (LSD 25), while in port at Roosevelt Roads, 
was approached by two CIA men. They asked if they could 
"requisition" his ship to carry some landing craft and crew 
from Vieques to a location off southern Cuba. The CIA men 
couldn't tell the commanding officer what the operation was 
all about. The commanding officer responded that he did not 
own the ship and did not have the authority to allow the CIA 
to "requisition" his ship. He could not respond to the 
request because he would have to check with his Navy 
superiors. Following Towner's briefing, Dennison was livid. 
He called General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, to find 
out what was going on. Lemnitzer said, "Don't you know?" 
Dennison replied, "I don't know anymore than I've already 
told you. What's it all about? I'm not going to turn my 
ship over to a couple of characters who say they're from CIA
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or any place else."3 Lemnitzer agreed to arrange a briefing 
of the operation for Dennison. On 2 November Bissell 
travelled to Norfolk and briefed Dennison on the operation.
Dennison was not satisfied with Bissell's brief. 
Dennision felt that Bissell was withholding information.
What was supposed to be done if Castro retaliated and made a 
move on Guantanamo? Dennison thought the plan was "stupid." 
"I think any military man who had anything to do with it 
could have told them the same thing. We weren’t asked to 
approve anything. We were just being told that this was by 
direction of the President and this was what was to be
done. ..." He thought it was a risky operation that would
probably fail and the U.S. Navy would be asked to come to 
the rescue.4
The entire idea appalled Dennison. He was the
commander of the Atlantic Fleet, yet he received no
intelligence support to assist him in the development of 
operation orders, rules of engagement, and movement orders. 
Following his briefing with Bissell, Dennison requested 
specific intelligence support from the CIA. The request 
consisted of over ninety intelligence requirements on the 
Cuban counter-revolutionary forces. Of the ninety requests, 
only twelve were fully answered. The other information was
3Ibid., 332-33.
4Ibid., 333-35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
sparse and provided limited information on Castro's forces.5 
Dennison had to make do with what he had at his disposal. 
There was little cooperation between the CIA and CINCLANT. 
Dennison and his staff did not know what the CIA was doing.
Because of the limited intelligence on Cuba Dennison 
relied on the dexterity of his staff to be able to draw 
contingency plans for the operation. There was such a cloud 
of secrecy over the project that everything was passed by 
word of mouth. Although favoring the security aspects of 
the operation Admiral Burke questioned the plan's 
probability of success without supporting paper work and 
discussion:
Very seldom are decisions made without paper work. 
Decisions are made in conferences. Without the advice 
of someone who knows there is [sic] no checks and 
balances in the operation.6
CINCLANT planners were also skeptical. An operation
conducted by word of mouth was not a good way to do
business. The lack of written directives created a greater
probability of someone making a mistake.7 On 9 February
1961 Admiral Burke instructed members of his staff to travel
to Norfolk to give Dennison a status report of the
5Ibid., 339.
6Admiral Arleigh Burke, interview by author, 22 
February 1988, notes from tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia.
7Aamiral Horatio Rivero, Jr., USN (Ret), Interview by 
Dr. John P. Mason, Jr., March 1978, Oral History Collection, 
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 333-34.
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operation. The briefing consisted of a description of the 
operation up to the arrival in the Amphibious Objective Area 
[AOA]. Of particular emphasis was the use of the Navy LSD 
and no ties to American involvement. Again, Dennison 
received no guidance on the measures necessary to protect 
Guantanamo.8 Admiral Horatio Rivero, Jr., Dennison's Deputy 
Chief of Staff, recalled, "All we had to do was to be 
prepared to play some part which we weren't quite sure what 
it was, at some time we weren't quite sure when it would be. 
It was the most fouled up thing I ever saw."9
Following the severing of U.S.-Cuban relations, 
American intelligence sources dried up. The government was 
unclear of the intelligence estimates of the strength of 
Castro and his forces. Soviet ships off-loaded at night. 
Rumors were rampant concerning whether the Cubans possessed 
Soviet MIGs, tanks, artillery, and communications equipment. 
Intelligence-gathering was merely conjecture, a true 
"crystal ball operation." The Navy was forbidden to conduct 
reconnaissance flights out of Guantanamo or Key West. 
Roosevelt Roads was too far away to be an adequate 
intelligence gathering center. Dennison's primary concern 
throughout the planning and execution phases of the 
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the supposed growth of Castro's forces around Guantanamo by 
deploying a Battalion Landing Team [BLT] and an Amphibious 
Squadron [PHIBRON] to Guantanamo. The USS Galveston 
(CLG 3), a 6"-gun cruiser, moved from Roosevelt Roads to 
Guantanamo. An additional attack squadron was added to 
Guantanamo. Destroyers receiving refresher training 
remained in Guantanamo indefinitely.10
CINCLANT planners could not narrow their field of view 
to the defense of Guantanamo. Key West was only ninety 
miles from the coast of Cuba. Dennison ordered the 
commanding officer of the naval station to increase his 
defense posture. Dennison requested additional protection 
from the Strategic Air Command [CINCSAC] through the JCS. 
CINCSAC responded by conducting Exercise "Southern Tip" in 
April 1961. The exercise called for the Commander of the 
North American Air Defenses [CONAD] to integrate forces from 
all the services and add them to the defenses and 
surveillance of the southern Florida region. JCS directed 
CINCLANT and CINCSAC to provide forces for the "exercise." 
CINCLANT provided an additional carrier fighter squadron to 
bolster Key West defenses.11
10Dennison, 338, 345.
11Ibid., 345; United States Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Memorandum 1899/649, 25 April 1961, Record Group 218, File 
3144, Box 44, Sect. 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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In addition to the increased defense posture, Dennison 
had other means of gathering intelligence. The Navy 
conducted frequent covert electronic surveillance off the 
coast of Cuba. During March and April 1961, the USS Perrv 
(DD 844), homeported in Mayport, Florida, was temporarily 
assigned to Key West Naval Station. The Perrv was 
electronically configured to conduct electronic 
"eavesdropping," intercepting Cuban radio transmissions. 
Additionally, the Perrv was equipped with electronic 
equipment designed to transmit signals similar to those of a 
task force. At times the Perrv approached as close as three 
miles to the coast of Cuba. The Perrv navigated around the 
coast of Cuba listening and transmitting signals to confuse 
Castro's forces. Several times the signals fooled Castro 
into making his naval forces sortie in response to the 
perceived threat of an invasion.12
Submarines in Submarine Squadron Twelve homeported in 
Key West, were used to conduct surveillance missions of the 
Cuban coast. The USS Threadfin (SS 410) frequently 
conducted coastal surveillance missions, missions to monitor 
shipping in and out of Cuba, and special missions navigating 
Cuban coastal waters for future references. The Threadfin
12Admiral Arleigh Burke, interview by author, 16 
September 1988, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia; Captain 
Lionel Krisel, interview by author, 12 September 1988, 
telephone interview, Long Beach, California; USS Perrv (DD 
849) Deck Logs, March-April 1961, National Archives and 
Record Center, Washington, D.C.
i.
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played a major role in the operation later in April.13
On 24 March 1961 the JCS notified CINCLANT that there 
would be a requirement to provide additional naval support 
for "Operation Crosspatch," which was now the code word for 
the entire operation. The JCS directed CINCLANT to use one 
destroyer to escort the CEF ships from Central America to 
the rendezvous point five miles off the coast of Cuba.
After arriving at the rendezvous point, the destroyers were 
not supposed to come any closer than three miles to the 
coast. A Navy dock landing ship (LSD) would be used to 
transport three utility boats (LCUs), and four motorized 
personnel carriers (LCVPs) of the Cuban Expeditionary Force 
[CEF] from Vieques to the rendezvous with the other brigade 
ships. Naval air cover would be provided for the CEF ships 
from sunrise to sunset while enroute to the AOA. D-Day was 
scheduled for 5 April 1961.14
On 28 March CINCLANT notified JCS that an anti­
submarine warfare exercise was scheduled between 3-18 April 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The anti-submarine warfare carrier 
USS Essex (CVS 9), accompanied by USS Murray (DDE 576), USS 
Waller (DDE 466), USS Conv (DDE 508), USS Conway (DDE 509), 
USS Bache (DDE 470), USS Beale (DDE 471), and USS Eaton (DDE 
510), would participate in the exercise. Dennison proposed
13Krisel interview, 12 September 1988.
14Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, p. 1.
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using two destroyers in mutual support of the CEF, defending 
against surface and air attacks, and to act as "shepherding" 
units in case any of the brigade ships became separated. 
Dennison notified the JCS that he had already deployed the 
standing Caribbean amphibious squadron to the area. An 
additional eighteen destroyers were scheduled to receive 
refresher training between 3-17 April. Jet fighter 
squadrons were deployed to Key West and Guantanamo. In 
order to avoid any appearances of increased U.S. presence in 
the area, Dennison scheduled a port visit for the Marine 
Battalion Landing Team to Jamaica on 13 April.
In the preliminary Rules of Engagement [ROE] submitted 
to JCS, CINCLANT recommended that in the event a Cuban naval 
vessel or suspicious unknown vessel attempted to close the 
force, the escort destroyers would maneuver to remain 
between the vessel and the CEF ships. The Cuban or unknown 
vessel would be warned not to approach any closer than gun 
range of tha convoy. If the craft continued to close the 
formation, a warning shot would be shot across the bow. If 
the contact closed within two thousand yards or opened fire 
on the convoy, the Navy ships would be authorized to open 
fire until the ship either would surrender, retire, or be 
destroyed.
The ROE contained instructions for combat air patrols 
and air controllers. Combat air patrols would identify any 
aircraft approaching radar range. If the aircraft were
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Cuban, the combat air patrol would make a fly-by to make 
sure the Cuban aircraft would be aware of the American 
presence. If the Cuban aircraft continued to close the 
force, the U.S. combat air patrol would continue to make 
attempts to divert the supposed hostile threat. If the 
Cuban aircraft were to make attempts to get into a position 
to attack the convoy, authorization would be granted for the 
combat air patrol to fire on the Cuban aircraft.
The concluding recommendation from CINCLANT was a 
planner's ominous forewarning. The code name "Operation 
Crosspatch" was already used to describe the Swan Island 
operation. In order to avoid any confusion CINCLANT 
recommended changing the name of the U.S. naval aspects of 
the operation to "Operation Bumpy Road."15
On 1 April 1961 the JCS approved CINCLANT's ROE in JCSM 
363-61. All aspects of the ROE were approved and additional 
directions were inserted concerning the possible presence of 
Soviet submarines. In the event that the convoy were to be 
shadowed or closed by a surfaced submarine, it would be 
treated as a surface ship. If the submarine was submerged, 
the destroyer escorts would request the unknown submarine 
contact to identify itself. If the submarine failed to 
identify itself after a second request, the escort ships 
would warn the contact that it would be attacked if it
15Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab A, pp. 1-4.
L.
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failed to do so. If the submarine still failed to identify 
itself, the escorts were to treat the submarine as if it 
were preparing to attack. Permission would be given to 
attack the submarine using all authorized means possible 
until it either would retire, surface and identify itself, 
or be destroyed. JCSM 363-61 also approved changing the 
code word of the Navy's involvement in the operation to 
"Operation Bumpy Road."16
Monday, 3 April 1961, appeared to be a routine day at 
the Destroyer-Submarine Piers, Norfolk Naval Station. The 
skies were clear with the temperatures approaching fifty 
degrees. The Murray, Eaton. Cony, Conway, Bache. and Beale 
were making preparations to get underway for what was 
thought to be anti-submarine warfare operations off the 
coast of Rhode Island. The ships were part of Destroyer 
Squadron Twenty-Eight of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Hunter- 
Killer Force Atlantic under the flag of the Rear Admiral 
John Clark, Commander, Task Group 81.8. The routine 
steaming schedule consisted of two weeks underway trying to 
locate and identify Soviet submarines in the Atlantic. The 
underway period was followed by two weeks in port for 
maintenance and upkeep. The underway cycle continued after 
the inport period. Operations were routine and this 
appeared to be another typical underway period. Underway
16Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab B, pp. 186-87.
Il
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time for the ships of Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Eight was 
between 0830 and 1C00.17
Once underway the Eaton led the formation out of the 
Thimble Shoals Channel. At 1225 the Murray and Eaton 
rendezvoused and took station on the Essex and proceeded 
south with the other ships in the formation following 
behind. The transit was uneventful. Drills at general 
quarters, gunnery exercises, steering casualty drills, and 
small arms practice filled the ships' schedules. At night 
the Murray and Eaton conducted flashing light drills, a 
normal underway exercise between two ships. What made this 
exercise different was that the flashing lights on the 
signal bridges were jury-rigged so that they could be 
controlled by the Combat Information Center to be used as 
search lights. Under the supervision of Captain Robert 
Crutchfield, Commander, Destroyer Division 281, on board the 
Eaton. the ships took turns trying to locate each other in 
the darkness. The ships conducted this exercise throughout 
the transit.
Once the squadron arrived off the coast of 
Jacksonville, Florida, it became obvious that the operation 
was no longer a typical anti-submarine sweep in the
17Captain William Smoot, USNR (Ret), Interview by Dr. 
John P. Mason, Jr., 3 April 1973, Oral History Department, 
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1-2; USS 
Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 3 April 1961, National Archives 
and Record Center, Washington, D.C.
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Atlantic. The Essex, normally configured to handle anti­
submarine warfare S-3 aircraft had been modified to land and 
launch A-4D fighter/attack aircraft. The squadron of A-4Ds 
landed on board the Essex on 5 April. Questions concerning 
the presence of the A-4Ds on the Essex remained unanswered. 
The operation was cloaked in secrecy. The only thing 
obvious to the crews of the ships was that the formation 
remained on a southerly course throughout the transit. No 
one was allowed to see the navigation charts with the 
exception of the Commanding Officer, and the Executive 
Officer, who plotted the ship's position and determined 
courses and speeds required to stay on track.18
The secrecy continued as the squadron proceeded 
westward past Key West and into the Gulf of Mexico. On 7 
April the squadron received fuel from the USS Elokomin (AO 
55). During the refueling evolution the Murray received 
Lieutenants (Junior Grade) James W. Corey and Robert W. 
Sickles from the Elokomin by high-line transfer. Personnel 
transfers were common and quite frequent during 
replenishment details. But Corey and Sickles' presence 
raised suspicions among the crew of the Murray. They were 
specially trained air traffic controllers. Another unusual 
event took place later that afternoon. The Murray and Eaton 
conducted towing exercises. Exercises like these are not
18Smoot, 2-3.
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ordinary or common. They are time-extensive and require 
deft ship handling. There was little margin of error when 
towing another vessel. The exercise lasted for 
approximately two hours with each ship taking turns towing 
the other.19
While Task Group 81.8 was in transit to the Gulf of 
Mexico, discussions continued in Washington concerning the 
Navy's ROE. Secretary McNamara received a briefing from the 
JCS and was told that once the President gave the go-ahead 
for the operation, the ROE would be submitted for his 
approval. After discussing the ROE with the Joint Chiefs, 
McNamara felt that too much authority was given to the 
individual lower levels of command. Another concern dealt 
with the possibility of the U.S. being seen as an active 
participant in the operation. McNamara directed the JCS to 
ensure that there was no way the U.S. would become overtly 
involved in the operation. Following a meeting with General 
Lemnitzer, Dulles, Bissell and General Charles P. Cabell, 
Deputy Director of the CIA, McNamara stated that if the U.S. 
were drawn into supporting the CEF in transit the operation 
would be called off and the CEF forces would be directed to 
a port chosen by the CIA.20
19USS Elokomin (AO 55) Deck Logs, 7 April 1961,
National Archives and Record Center, Washington, D.C.; USS 
Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 7 April 1961.
^Taylor Report, Annex 29, p. 1.
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Even though the ships were already underway, the JCS 
notified CINCLANT that D-Day was postponed on 5 April for at 
least forty-eight hours. This was too late to stop a 
scheduled anti-submarine sweep of the Central American 
coast. On 6 April Kennedy was uncomfortable with the size 
of the operation. He expressed his desire that all efforts 
be made to keep the American presence in the operation at as 
low a profile as possible. Precautions needed to be made to 
insure that U.S. support for the CEF was not apparent and 
that the U.S. could "plausibly deny" any participation in 
the operation. Acting on the President's directives the JCS 
modified the ROE in JCSM 179-61. The Navy would provide 
area coverage rather than convoy protection for the CEF 
ships. During daylight hours the escorting destroyers would 
maintain a practical range ahead of the force and steer 
courses and speeds in such a way as to maintain protection 
but not appear to be screening. During the night the 
destroyers would take station close enough to provide 
adequate protection. The Chiefs reiterated that there would 
be no Navy support for the landing. The only direct aid 
would consist of the San Marcos transitting to "Point 
Oldsmobile" to rendezvous with the CEF ships and drop off 
the brigade's landing craft. "Point Oldsmobile" was a point 
approximately five miles off the coast of the Bay of Pigs 
where the CEF ships lined up for their approach to the 
beach. The escort destroyers, after leading the CEF to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
landing area, would withdraw to "Point Packard," a point 
approximately 125 miles south of the AOA, just north of the 
Cayman Islands. This point would be the "MODLOC" point, 
that location where the Navy ships would remain during the 
operation and the Essex would conduct flight operations. 
Prior to the rendezvous with the CEF ships, the commanding 
officers of the destroyers were directed to intervene only 
if it would protect the ships from attack or capture. The 
Navy would open fire only if the CEF were to be attacked.
The new ROE authorized the destroyer commanding officers to 
stay between the convoy and any Cuban craft or suspicious 
vessels. The commanding officers were authorized to warn 
the ship to stay out of range. If it failed to do so, the 
destroyers were directed to "intervene as necessary."21
Combat air patrol and air controllers received similar 
instructions as did the surface ships. The combat air 
patrol could not appear to be protecting the CEF. Other 
guidelines were similar to previous ROE's with the exception 
that if the Cuban aircraft ignored repeated warnings and 
continued to close the force and appeared ready to attack 
with its bomb bays open the friendly combat air patrol could 
attack. The other major issue of the directive was that D- 
Day was postponed again. The new D-Day was set for 17
21Taylor Report, Annex 29, Tab C, Enclosure F, pp. 1-2.
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April.22
On 12 April the Essex and its escorts turned south to 
leave the Gulf of Mexico for its rendezvous with the CEF off 
the coast of Nicaragua. As of that date the commanding 
officers in the squadron were directed by Rear Admiral Clark 
to omit any information dealing with the operation from the 
deck logs and insert the term "Special Operations" into the 
ship's position block. Some ships, such as the Murray. 
maintained course and speed changes, daily ship's routines, 
replenishment details, and special evolution entries in the 
deck logs. The Elokomin was not attached to Task Group 81.8 
and kept the deck logs intact. The Elokomin refueled every 
ship in the squadron, including the Essex, and annotated the 
deck logs accordingly.
This emphasis on security remained paramount during 
the transit. The White House and CIA insisted on minimizing 
the American presence in the operation. Each ship was 
directed to paint over the ship's hull numbers and name. 
Stack markings were also to be painted over. After 
considerable cross-deck briefings from Rear Admiral Clark, 
the commanding officers complied with the directive.23
Even as the squadron proceeded to the rendezvous with 
the CEF, the final plans for the operation were still not
“ibid., 2-3.
^SS Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 14 April 1961.
k.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ironed out. The plan differed drastically from the original 
concept of March 1960. In early April the plan called for 
limited air strikes on D -2. At the same time a 
diversionary landing would be conducted in Oriente Province 
in eastern Cuba. The air strikes would be conducted by 
Cuban pilots "defecting" from the Cuban Air Force. The 
defection story was intended to reduce the likelihood of the 
U.S. being tied to the operation. The D-Day landing would 
appear to be generated by support from within Cuba. Admiral 
Burke did not support the defection story or the D -2 air 
strikes because of the attack's "indecisive nature" and the 
danger of prematurely alerting Castro's forces. The CIA 
favored D-Day air strikes instead of the D -2 defection air 
strike. But "political advantages" proposed by the State 
Department forced the inclusion of the D -2 air strikes, 
even though the main emphasis of the operation remained on 
the D-Day air strikes.24
In a meeting with Kennedy, McNamara, and other 
National Security Council [NSC] officials on 12 April, 
Bissell outlined the latest changes to the plan and 
formulated the final time line. On D -7 the main force 
would be staged in Puerto Cabezas. Staging would be 
completed by D -5. On the morning of D -6 the first vessels 
would sail from Puerto Cabezas. The last vessel was
24Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 12-13.
L
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scheduled to depart in the early morning hours of D -4. On 
D -2 a limited air strike conducted by "defectors" would be 
launched from Retalheu. On the night of D -1 the airborne 
company would be loaded aboard transport aircraft in 
Retalheu. The main landing on D-Day would be accompanied by 
another series of air strikes. Two B-26s and a liaison 
plane would drop propaganda leaflets and then land on the 
captured air strip. A provisional government would then be 
established. The CEF ships would return to the beach on the 
morning of D+l to complete the discharge of the supplies.
On D+7 another diversionary landing was scheduled to take 
place in Pinar del Rio. After the briefing Kennedy was 
hesitant to give the final go-ahead to the plan. Bissell 
advised the President that the "Go— No-Go" date for the air 
strike was 1200 14 April and 1200 16 April for the main 
landing.25
The Essex battle group arrived off the coast of 
Nicaragua on 14 April. Each ship was assigned a sector to 
cover for the final transit of the CEF naval forces to Cuba. 
The Blaaar was the command and control ship of the CEF 
forces. Other ships in the brigade included the Rio 
Escondido. Houston. Santa Barbara. Barbara J. Caribe. and 
Atlantico. The Navy was warned prior to the rendezvous by 
General Cabell to minimize American visibility. Again, the
^Ibid., 14.
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ROE changed. Actual engagement of Cubans needed to be
avoided at all costs until the very last minute and only
after it was clear that failure to respond would jeopardize
all of the CEF ships. Allowing the Cubans to fire on the
CEF ships was now acceptable and the Navy should wait until
Castro's forces "honed in for the kill." Every effort
should be made to not "blow the operation by overly active
intervention." The original concept of the operation was to
provide support so that the operation would not fail. The
concept was modified so that it could be cancelled at the
last minute. The concept was further modified by warning
that the mission would be aborted if the Navy had to
intervene. The JCS stressed to CINCLANT and each commanding
officer in the squadron that the Navy's involvement should
not be the reason for aborting the mission:
It is desired to minimize the need to abort the 
operation, because of U.S. engagement of Castro's 
ships or aircraft in combat in [the! conduct of [the] 
protective mission assigned to you.
Once the Essex and its escorts rendezvoused with the
CEF ships, the force headed for Cuba. During the first
night of the transit, troops on board the Atlantico were
conducting gunnery practice with small arms and .50 caliber
machine guns. One man was killed and two were seriously
wounded whan one of the .50 caliber machine guns fell off
its mounting pod and discharged. The Eaton pulled alongside
^Taylor Report, Annex 29, Tab D, pp. 1-2.
I.
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and the wounded men were transferred for emergency surgery. 
One man had a serious wound to his stomach and the other had 
one of his heels shot off. The Navy surgical team on board 
the Eaton conducted the emergency surgery on the two 
soldiers prior to evacuating them to Guantanamo.27
Prior to arriving in the objective area, the Eaton 
picked up one CIA agent and four Cuban UDT personnel. The 
CIA agent, Grayston Lynch, was supposed to lead the Cuban 
UDT team on to the beach prior to the invasion. The UDT was 
used for reconnaissance and beach preparations. The team 
was to be sent to the beach by the Threadfin. but Lynch's 
claustrophobia kept him from travelling in a submarine. The 
team then transferred to the Eaton for further 
transportation to the beach.28
The operation commenced on D -2, 15 April 1961.
Kennedy gave the go-ahead from his retreat at Glen Ora, 
Virginia. Kennedy wanted to reduce the size and visibility 
of the operation and directed the CIA to cut the air strike 
composition from fourteen to eight B-26 bombers. The 
bombers struck the air fields at Campo Libertad, San Antonio 
de los Banos, and Santiago de Cuba. Three B-26s attacked 
Campo Libertad. Two attacked San Antonio de los Banos, 
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battle damage assessments reported that 50 percent of 
Castro's air force was destroyed at Campo Libertad. Losses 
at San Antonio de los Banos were reported at 75 percent to 
80 percent of the air forces on the ground. The destruction 
at Santiago de Cuba included two B-26s, one DC-3, one 
Lodestar, and one T-33. Follow-on photographic studies and 
interpretation revealed that the initial reports were 
exaggerated.29 Castro's air force survived the initial air 
strike.
A second air strike was scheduled to commence at dawn 
of D-Day to wipe out the remainder of the Cuban Air Force. 
Problems and confusion arose which resulted in the second 
air strike being cancelled. In order to placate the State 
Department and make the invasion look like it was generated 
from within Cuba a fake "defector" story was established in 
which a so-called defecting Cuban Air Force B-26 would flee 
to Florida following an attack on Castro's installations.
The defection was supposed to coincide with the initial air 
strike. During the initial air strike the B-26 "defector" 
with Cuban Air Force markings piloted by members of the CEF 
landed in Miami. But on Saturday, April 14, a genuine 
defector landed in Jacksonville, Florida. To add to the 
confusion a B-26 involved in the initial attack crash landed 
at Key West Naval Station. The "defecting" B-26, piloted by
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 15; Part III, 
Annex 22, p. 2.
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Captain Mario Zuniga, landed in Miami after a direct flight 
from Nicaragua. The plane was riddled with bullet holes. 
Zuniga told reporters that he was a defecting pilot from the 
Cuban Air Force.30 The plane was photographed with the 
Cuban Air Force markings clearly visible and the bullet 
holes in the engine and fuselage. The "defection" story and 
photographs were released to the press. Two days earlier, 
Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, warned 
that such an attempt to mask U.S. involvement in a planned 
invasion was imminent. Roa claimed that exile operations 
sponsored by the U.S. were in progress and Swan Island 
continued to broadcast anti-Castro propaganda with the 
assistance of the CIA. Following the initial air strike Roa 
called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council 
tc voice Cuban protests over the U.S.-sponsored aggression. 
At the U.N. session, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, kept 
uninformed by the State Department and White House 
officials, defended the "defection" story supported by the 
statements of the defecting pilot and pictures of the B-26. 
The CIA committed several blunders which left Stevenson in a 
position of defending a questionable story. The B-26 in 
Miami had a plexiglas nose while the Cuban Air Force's B-26s 
had opaque noses. The tail guns were removed in order to 
place additional gasoline tanks for the long flight from
30Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York:
Harper & Row, 1971), 1356-57.
IL
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Nicaragua. Tape covered the gun nuzzles and the bomb racks 
were corroded.31 Stevenson's account of the defection was 
easily disputed by Roa.
Stevenson received a briefing on the truth behind the 
entire operation only after his credibility was placed on 
the line for having to defend the American position against 
the charges of the Cuban Ambassador. Stevenson felt shunned 
by Washington because his credibility in the diplomatic 
community was disregarded. On Sunday, 16 April, Stevenson 
was furious that he had been led to push the defection 
story. He travelled to Washington to object to Kennedy and 
insisted that any further air strikes be cancelled.32 
Kennedy's foreign policy advisers supported Stevenson's 
contention to cancel the follow-on air strikes. The cover 
on American involvement was blown after the initial air 
strike. China and the Soviet Union warned that the raids 
threatened world peace and hinted that there might be some 
sort of intervention in support of Castro. Latin American 
leaders, although wary of Castro and willing to support 
attempts to remove him from power, were concerned that they 
were not informed or consulted on the American decision to
31Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red;
The Story of the Secret War Against Cuba (New York: Harper
& Row, 1981), 262.
■̂ John Ranelagh, The Aaencv: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 368.
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carry out the initial air strike.33 After receiving a 
briefing of the day's events from National Security Adviser 
McGeorge Bundy and finally bowing to the pressure of his 
advisers, Kennedy cancelled the second air strike on the 
night of 16 April.
Kennedy did not understand the significance of the 
second air strike and what kind of repercussions it would 
have if it were allowed to go on or if it were cancelled.34 
As the operation began and progressed, the cancellation of 
the second air strike and the failure to eliminate Castro's 
air force would be crucial in the demise of the operation. 
Also of great magnitude was Kennedy's failure to receive 
from the JCS a wide-scope of advice on the pros and cons of 
cancelling the raid. Encircling himself with his closest 
advisers shielded Kennedy from a full perspective of the 
potential negative ramifications of his decision.35
The Presidential directive to cancel the second air 
strike was not received in Central America until 2200, 16 
April. As originally scheduled, the second air strike was 
supposed to coincide with the invasion. Had Castro's air 
force been occupied with the incoming air strike, the
^Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), 301; Hinckle and Turner, 87.
^Stewart Alsop, The Center: People and Power in
Political Washington (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 223-
24.
^Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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invasion force night have had fewer obstacles to encounter
in the initial hours of the landing. The Joint Chiefs did
not receive word that the second air strike had been
cancelled until Monday morning. Admiral Burke was notified
when he arrived at the Pentagon War Room early Monday
morning after the invasion had already commenced. General
Lemnitzer dejectedly said, "Blithely cancelling the most
critical operation in the whole campaign without ever
telling us or consulting us [was] indicative of the whole
operation."3® Burke was even more upset:
Kennedy didn't want to take military advice because he 
didn't want to take military action. [Kennedy] was 
afraid that if the military people got involved 
[American participation] would grow. It usually does. 
If you use physical power you have to use the military 
and it's dangerous. The President wanted to do 
something that had great effect with no danger. But 
things don't come that way.37
The failure to conduct a second air strike was not the 
only major blunder as the operation started. The 
diversionary landing scheduled to coincide with the initial 
air strike never occurred. The Santa Ana, with a group of 
160 men led by Nino Diaz, was supposed to land thirty miles 
east of Guantanamo to divert attention from the main 
landing. Once ashore the group would organize guerrilla
^Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and 
his Joint chiefs of staff" (Ph.D. diss., University of South 
Carolina, 1981), 196; Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, 
pp. 17-18.
37Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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activity in the province. The diversionary landing was 
supposed to draw Castro's forces to the east and confuse his 
command. But the plan did not go as originally intended.
On the night of 15 April the Santa Ana pulled up to the 
beach. Diaz' reconnaissance team went ashore. They 
returned claiming that there were strange lights on the 
beach and the party of sympathizers arranged to coordinate 
the landing never appeared. In their efforts the team lost 
two of the reconnaissance boats. Diaz decided to pull the 
Santa Ana out to sea and wait until the next night. The 
following night the operation was aborted because the 
remaining reconnaissance boats broke down and it took too 
long to recover them. After the second night's aborted 
mission the CIA ordered Diaz to proceed to the Bay of Pigs 
and join the invasion. The general conclusion of those 
involved in the conduct and evaluation of the operation was 
that Diaz turned-tail when faced with opposition. His weak 
leadership was the cause for scrapping an integral part of 
the operation. Without a diversion Castro had the resources 
necessary to concentrate his forces in the central landing
38area.
The hope that the initial air strike would spur on a 
general rebellion from within Cuba never materialized.
Castro had created an effective organization, the Committee
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 22, p. 3.
L
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
for the Defense of the Revolution, to police the Cuban 
populace. Its responsibilities included civil patrols 
intended to keep an eye on those suspected of being opposed 
to the revolution. Following the air strike Castro used the 
intelligence provided by the Committee to round up over 
50,000 suspected guerrillas and sympathizers.39
The main invasion began at the Bay of Pigs with little 
chance of success. There was no air support, diversionary 
attack, or popular support for the invading forces. At 
approximately 0100 17 April, the Eaton. accompanied by the 
Murray. landed the first Cuban UDT team lead by CIA agent 
Lynch. The Blaaar. followed in a column formation at 800 
yard intervals by the Caribe. Atlantico. Barbara J. Houston. 
and Rio Escondido, headed to the beach. Red Beach was 
located at the northern tip of the bay. Blue Beach was
located on the eastern side of the bay. Green Beach was
located on the eastern seaward side of the bay. Five miles
from the beach the San Marcos appeared in the darkness.
After rendezvousing with the force, the San Marcos off­
loaded the LCUs and LCVPs. The landing craft went alongside 
the CEF ships to off-load the brigade. After the off-load 
the San Marcos departed from the objective area. The 
Barbara J and Houston left the column and proceeded to Red 
Beach. The Blaqar. Caribe. and Rio Escondido, moved to
"̂ Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel 
Castro (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), 97.
*" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
within two miles of Blue Beach to send in other UDT teams.40 
The Atlantico headed for Green Beach. The Navy vessels 
proceeded south to rendezvous with the Essex approximately 
125 miles south of the bay. Following the rendezvous they 
refueled with the Elokomin and assumed duties as escorts for 
the Essex and stand-by for possible anti-air warfare picket 
duties for the CEF. The Eaton and Murray proceeded back to 
the bay after refueling.41
with the Eaton and Murray standing off the Bay of 
Pigs, the landing started after the UDT teams moved ashore. 
The town of Playa Giron on the bay was well lit. The Cuban 
UDT team observed men on the beach as they made their way 
over the coral barriers in the bay. A headlight shined on 
the incoming team and Lynch fired on it. Lynch radioed back 
to the Blaaar about the incident and passed instructions to 
expedite the off-loading. Following a short fire fight 
Blagar moved back among the coral reefs and allowed the 
first wave of LCVPs into the beach. The first LCVP in the 
wave struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach. The
LCVP lowered its ramp and the troops waded to shore. At
0115 Brigade Commander Jose Perez San Roman went ashore and
40 • • • *Burke interview, 16 September 1988; Captain Lionel 
Krisel, interview by author, Telephone, 31 August 1988; 
Taylor Report, Annex 27, pp. 3-4.
41USS Conwav (DDE 507) Deck Logs, 17 April 1961,
National Archives and Record Center, Washington, D.C.; USS
Elokomin (AO 55) Deck Logs, 17 April 1961.
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commenced unloading troops and supplies. The UDT teams 
warned the second LCVP of the coral and instructed it to 
drop its ramp once it touched down and allow the troops to 
move in. As a result of their wading in the bay, all the 
hand-held communications gear of the initial landing forces 
was water-logged and inoperable, another variable that was 
not considered by the CIA planners. Information had to be 
passed to the ships using the communications gear of the UDT 
teams. Lynch returned to the Blacrar to coordinate the 
landing while the UDT's remained on the beach to prepare for 
the landing of the LCUs. By 0300 the unloading of the 
troops from the Caribe was completed. Because of the lack 
of communication from Blue Beach to the surrounding beaches, 
Atl&ntico was directed to make its landing at Blue Beach 
rather than Green Beach. Throughout the early hours of the 
morning the UDT teams tried to find a way for the LCUs and 
LCVPs to travel through the coral reefs. Local fisherman 
showed the way through and the first LCU arrived on Blue 
Beach at 0600. After the first LCU completed off-loading 
the second LCU moved in. By daybreak three LCU loads of 
tanks, trucks, and other vehicles landed on Blue Beach.42
Like the landing at Blue Beach, there was little 
opposition encountered at Red Beach as the 2nd and 5th 
Battalions landed. But problems arose when the troops from
42Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 19; Part III, 
Annex 22, pp. 5-6; Part III, Annex 27, pp. 2-7.
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the Barbara J and Houston encountered considerable 
difficulty getting ashore. The boats that were supposed to 
transport the troops to the beach broke down during the 
start-up prior to the off-loading. Of the nine boats 
capable of transporting the troops to the beach, only two 
worked. The 5th Battalion never got ashore because of the 
boat problems and a lack of initiative from the Brigade 
Commander on the Houston. As a result, few supplies got 
ashore. Despite the logistical problems 2nd Battalion 
secured Playa Giron and captured the local radio station.
By daylight the brigade secured Red Beach.43
At 0630 the Cuban Air Force responded. Red Beach was 
strafed and the Houston was struck by rockets. Fires broke 
out in Number 1 and Number 3 holds. The crew extinguished 
the fires and returned to try to continue off-loading the 
troops, but the Houston was hit by two more rockets from a 
Cuban T-33. The rockets struck the stern and knocked ou . 
the ship's steering. After losing its rudder the Houston 
lost all steerageway. The ship's master of the Houston 
decided that it would be safest to beach the ship on the 
west side of the bay about five miles south of Red Beach. 
One squad of 2nd Battalion, all of 5th Battalion, and the 
ship's crew abandoned ship.44
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 20.
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, pp. 19-21.
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Cuban air strikes were relentless throughout the 
morning. The CEF was virtually defenseless without air 
support. Cuban B-26s and T-33s strafed the beaches and 
brigade ships with no opposition. Castro's air force had 
total control of the air. The brigade's C-46s and C-54s 
conducted parachute and supply drops in the midst of a 
constant barrage of hostile fire without any air support. 
Fighting on the ground was fierce as the parachutists of 1st 
Battalion seized the road center of San Bias ten miles 
northeast of Blue Beach, and the ingress points north and 
east of the beach head. On Blue Beach the brigade received 
continuous strafing runs from the T-33s. At 0930 the Rio 
Escondido was hit and sunk by missiles shot from the Cuban 
T-33s. It carried ten days of supplies and ammunition, and 
the communications gear for the brigade. The sinking of the 
Rio Escondido was a vital tactical loss to the brigade.
With depleting ammunition and no communications the brigade 
faced numerous obstacles in maintaining the beachhead with 
little likelihood of success. Even though the brigade 
secured the air strip at Playa Giron and the beaches 
remained secure, continuous enemy air strikes forced the 
brigade's ships to sea.45 Without ammunition or logistical 
support from the ships, the brigade on the beach was in dire 
straits as Castro increased pressure at the end of D-Day.
^Ibid.; Part III, Annex 27, pp. 8-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
After the Rio Escondido and Houston sank, the CIA 
ordered the ships to head out to sea to a safe haven fifteen 
miles off the coast that was to be provided by a picket line 
of Navy destroyers and aircraft from the Essex. The Blaaar. 
Santa Barbara, and Barbara J made their way to the safe 
haven. The Caribe and AtlAntico continued past the 
rendezvous. The Eaton and Murray chased the retreating 
ships for approximately 130 miles before they threatened to 
open fire on the CEF ships to make them stop. Colonel J. F. 
Mallard, USMC, the CIA Communications Officer on the Essex, 
and Captain Crutchfield urged the masters of the Caribe and 
Atlantico to return. The masters refused to return to the 
beach without a guarantee that there would be air cover for 
the forces. There was talk of mutiny among the crews of the 
Caribe and Atlantico. After heated discussions with Mallard 
and Crutchfield, the ships turned around and headed back to 
the safe haver.
In order to prevent the unrestricted Cuban air strikes 
on the beach, it was essential to eliminate or neutralize 
Castro's air forces. Kennedy agreed to allow the CIA to 
coordinate a bombing run consisting of two waves of three B- 
26s to hit as many air fields as possible with fragmentation 
bombs. At 1615 of D-Day the order was given to launch the 
B-26s. Unfortunately the bombing runs failed because the B- 
26s encountered considerable cloud cover and haze and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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lights surrounding the targets were blacked out.46
Late on the night of D-Day and early D+l, the 
AtlAntico returned to the AOA. The Caribe was too far away 
from the beach and never played a major role in the 
remainder of the operation. The Atldntico off-loaded its 
cargo to the LCUs for the run into the beach during the 
night time and was supposed to return before daylight. The 
off-loading took longer than expected and the LCUs could not 
get to the beach before daylight. The CIA in Washington 
directed the Atl&ntico to keep the LCUs alongside and not 
try to make the run to the beach. The CIA attempted to get 
supplies and ammunition to the beach by CEF air drops. The 
probability of sufficiently rearming the brigade was low.
The air drops were conducted by four C-54s and two C-46s. 
Only five drops were successful. Some drops landed in the 
jungle. Others landed in the water.47
The Eaton and Murray remained outside the coral reefs 
during the operation and watched with futility as the 
brigade was pushed back by the Cuban Army and Air Force.
The ROE from the transit remained in effect and there was 
little the Navy could dc to assist the forces. On the 
morning of D-Day the JCS ordered Dennison and Clark to be
^Admiral Robert Crutchfield, interview by author, 31 
August 1988, telephone, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Taylor 
Report, Part III, Annex 22, 
p. 7.
47Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, p. 11.
b*.
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prepared to provide unmarked combat air patrols for the CEF 
shipping outside Cuban territorial waters. The combat air 
patrols were not authorized to provide protection inside the 
AOA. Clark was directed to create a picket line of early 
warning ships no closer than thirty miles from the coast.48 
At 0550 local time, the JCS stressed to Clark that the early 
warning destroyers could not approach closer than the 
thirty-mile limit and should be spread in a wide-spaced 
picket line. Again, the use of combat air patrol in support 
of the CEF was not authorized.49
The sinking of the Rio Escondido and Houston changed 
the complexity of the operation and the Navy's involvement. 
By 1030 the Navy had already established the safe haven with 
combat air patrol protection for the Cuban ships fifteen 
miles off the coast. In the same message directing the 
establishing of the safe haven CINCLANT received further 
confusing modifications to the ROE. No carrier operations 
were allowed closer than fifty miles from the coast. No 
U.S. aircraft could come within fifteen miles of the coast. 
There could be no more than four aircraft on station at a 
time. Hot pursuit was not allowed over Cuban territory.
U.S. aircraft could not close a Cuban aircraft unless it was 
preparing to attack. If any enemy aircraft were shot down,
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, p. 2.
49Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab F, "JCS 
Message 994222 to CINCLANT/CTG SI.8, 171050ZAPR61."
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every effort should be made to hide U.S. involvement.50 The 
order from Washington baffled Dennison. It told him exactly 
how to establish the safe haven, how many destroyers to use, 
and how to use the destroyers. Until that time Admiral 
Burke gave Dennison a great amount of flexibility and leeway 
to "lean" on his orders. Dennison passed this flexibility 
to Clark. The orders from the White House took away a great 
amount of decision-making capability at the lower levels of 
command. In a phone call to General Lemnitzer, Dennison 
said, "I've gotten a good many orders in my life, but this 
is a strange one." Lemnitzer did not understand what 
Dennison was talking about. Dennison explained, "Well the 
last paragraph in it says that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
interpret this to mean, set up a safe haven. This is the 
first order I ever got from somebody who found it necessary 
to interpret his own orders." Lemnitzer responded, "Where 
did you get this directive?" Dennison replied, "I got it 
from you." Lemnitzer said, "Who do you think wrote it?" 
Dennison replied, "You did." Lemnitzer answered, "No, I 
didn't. That order was written at 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue." At this point Dennison was infuriated, "Well you 
can tell 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue that I'm not going to do 
it that way. I'll do what they want done, but I'll use the 
forces that I think are necessary. They don't know what's
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab G, "JCS 
Message 994247 to CINCLANT, 172035ZAPR61."
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going on as much as I do."51 As expected, the Navy's 
involvement increased. The Navy received directions to make 
preparations to come to the aid of the CIA.
At 0400 on D+l, 18 April, Castro's forces opened fire 
on the brigade in the San Bias area north of the bay with 
artillery. Communications still did not exist between Blue 
Beach and the outer perimeter of the beachhead. Officer 
couriers were used to shuttle messages from Blue Beach to 
the battle areas. The artillery fire continued and the 
troops were forced to withdraw towards Blue Beach. The 
troops on Red Beach encountered a similar constant barrage 
of artillery fire throughout the day. In the early morning 
tanks were seen approaching Blue Beach. By 0730 the 
worsening situation forced the troops on Red Beach to move 
to Blue Beach. The troop movement to Blue Beach was 
completed by 1000. They were given a few hours rest and 
sent back to Red Beach. At 0824 Blue Beach came under 
attack from twelve tanks and four jet aircraft. Ammunition 
dwindled. At 1010 Red Beach was overrun. The force 
consolidated on Blue Beach. The Cuban artillery and air 
strikes remained relentless throughout the brigade's 
retreat.52 The heat of battle created a problem in the flow 
of information to Washington and Norfolk. Burke and
51Dennison, 351-52.
Baylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab G, "JCS 
Message 99427 to CINCLANT, 172035ZAPR61."
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Dennison were not receiving accurate up-to-the-minute 
information on the operation. Kennedy authorized the Navy 
to use unmarked aircraft to conduct photo and visual 
reconnaissance. The President directed the unmarked 
reconnaissance planes to protect themselves only if 
attacked. Burke urged Dennsion and Clark to keep sending 
updates and good intelligence to Washington. Burke wanted 
CINCLANT amphibious officers to review the intelligence 
reports to ensure their accuracy. The Essex closed the 
coast on the afternoon of D+l to launch the reconnaissance 
flights.53 At 1600 the Essex reported that a long line of 
tanks and trucks were approaching Blue Beach from the east. 
At 2000 the CIA asked San Romdn, the Brigade Commander, if 
he wished to prepare to evacuate the brigade. He refused to 
evacuate and said, "I will not be evacuated. We will fight 
to the end here if we have to."54
The air battle over the beach head raged throughout 
D+l. American contract pilots were used to supplement the 
Cuban pilots who were either too tired or refused to fly.
On the afternoon of D+l six sorties were flown from 
Nicaragua against the column of tanks approaching Blue Beach 
along the coastal road from the north. Napalm bombs and
“Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab H, "JCS 
Message 994309 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 181837ZAPR61."
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum I, pp. 22-23; Part 
II, Third Meeting, 25 August 1961; Part III, Annex 22, p. 8.
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rockets were used to check the Cuban advancement. Castro's 
forces responded quickly to the changing threat and modified 
their advances accordingly. The Cubans slowly encircled 
Blue Beach by the end of D+l.55
Admiral Burke grew increasingly frustrated with the 
Cuban onslaught of the CEF. Burke requested that the 
President authorize the use of naval gunfire support to lay 
down a barrage of fire on the approaching tanks. Kennedy 
asked Burke, "What if Castro's forces return the fire and 
hit the destroyers?" Burke responded, "Then we'll knock 
hell out of them!" Kennedy worried that the U.S. would then 
be directly involved. Burke responded, "We are involved, 
sir. Goddammit, Mr. President, we can not let those boys be 
slaughtered out there!"56 Kennedy realized that the 
operation was failing miserably. Red Beach was lost. 
Continuous air strikes and strafing of Blue Beach made the 
brigade's predicament untenable. Kennedy authorized the JCS 
to prepare unmarked aircraft for combat use. The number of 
airplanes necessary to complete the job was left to the 
discretion of Admiral Dennison and Admiral Clark. Burke 
ordered units from Amphibious Squadron Two located in the 
vicinity of Guantanamo, to steam towards the Bay of Pigs.
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 23.
^Mario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Reader's Digest. 
September 1964,
285; Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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In addition to the preparation of combat aircraft, Burke 
ordered Clark to prepare unmarked naval boats for possible 
use in evacuation operations.57
The last opportunity to get ammunition to the beach 
was between the late hours of D+l and early hours of D+2. A 
C-54 landed at the air strip at Playa Giron to drop off 
ammunition and pick up a wounded pilot. The JCS informed 
CINCLANT that unmarked U.S. Air Force C-130s might be used 
for air drops.58 The C-130 air drops never materialized.
Even if they did take place, it would have been too little 
too late. Cuban forces closed off the beach and prepared 
for the final push to the bay.
On the morning of D+2, 19 April, Kennedy sought an 
opportunity to alleviate the pressure on the beachhead. At 
the request of the CIA, Kennedy directed the JCS to furnish 
air cover consisting of six unmarked aircraft over the CEF 
forces between 0630 and 0730 to protect against air attacks 
from the Cuban air force. The Navy was directed to provide 
air cover and nothing else. It could not strike at any 
Cuban forces on the ground. There could be no air combat, 
only protection of the CEF Air Force if attacked. The JCS 
directive ordered Clark to make sure the pilots carried as 
little identification as possible. If a Navy plane was shot
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab I, "JCS 
Message 994317 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 181947ZAPR61."
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 23-24, 28.
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and required ditching, the pilots were ordered to ditch at 
sea. Air drops were scheduled using C-46s between the hours 
the Navy air protection was supposed to be on station.
While the air drops were in progress, CEF B-26s were 
scheduled to attack Cuban tanks and artillery positions. 
Clark also received notification that he should prepare to 
conduct evacuation operations. If so, he should move units 
from Amphibious Squadron Two about thirty miles from the 
beach by 1300 that day. If needed, evacuations were 
scheduled to commence at 1700. Rescue boats had to be 
unmarked with any identification that could tie the U.S. to 
the operation removed. The original directive from the 
White House ordered the men of the rescue boats to wear 
civilian clothes. In the event that the men were captured, 
there could be no tie to the American naval involvement. 
Dennison felt that the evacuation plan designed by the White 
House showed no acknowledgement of the rights of the sailors 
involved. Without identification or names, the men, if 
captured by the Cubans, could be treated as spies. The men 
would not be entitled to the protection guaranteed to 
prisoner-of-wars under the Geneva Convention. Dennison 
disregarded the directive and instructed the crews of the 
boat to remain in dungarees and carry no identification. If 
the evacuation was to be conducted using the Navy ships, air
k
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cover was authorized to protect the landing craft.58 
Everything from the unmarked Navy jets to the unmarked Navy 
rescue craft crewed by American sailors with no 
identification made the entire evacuation process confusing 
and difficult for the participants to implement. There was
no doubt that the U.S. was heavily involved. It is very
difficult to hide American Navy ships inside the bay trying
to conduct rescue operations.
That morning there was an error in determining the 
time the CEF would conduct the air strike. The strike was 
scheduled for 0630 Cuban time. The CEF Air Force arrived an 
hour early. Even though the Essex launched immediately, the 
CEF already made its strikes against the beachhead and faced 
considerable Cuban air opposition.60 If the Essex had 
launched on time, the effectiveness of the strike so late in 
the operation would have been doubtful. Castro's forces had 
already closed in on the beach.
The situation on the beachhead was hopeless for the 
brigade. Castro's air force controlled the air while his 
tanks proceeded to the beach with little opposition. The 
CIA decided to prepare for the evacuation of the force.
There would be no more ammunition drops. The CIA reasoned
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab J, "JCS 
Message 994369 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 190837ZAPR61;" Rivero, 
335.
60Taylor Report, Part II, Seventh Meeting, 01 May 1961,
p. 1.
I
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that three days of ammunition was taken ashore on D-Day and 
air drops were conducted on that night. Additional air 
drops were made during the night of D+l and early morning 
hours of D+2. CIA leaders felt that it was a hopeless task 
to ask for destroyer or air support. Without overt U.S. 
support, the loss of the CEF ships would be inevitable.
Based on these assumptions, they felt justified in calling 
off the resupply effort by sea with the exception of one 
last air drop on D+2.61
American volunteer pilots continued to be used 
throughout the last hours of the operation. A B-26 carrying 
four American pilots was shot down early on Wednesday 
morning, D+2. The four Americans, Wade C. Gray, Thomas Ray, 
Riley Schlamberger, and Lee Barker, had been involved since 
the initial air strike. There was no way the U.S. 
government could deny involvement ir. the operation once the 
Americans were shot down.62
The troops in the San Bias region began a general 
retreat to Blue Beach after encountering consecutive air 
attacks and tank and artillery fires from the north and 
east. They could not stand the onslaught without 
ammunition, supplies, and air cover. At 1432, the Brigade
61 Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 24.
Thomas, 1368n; Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: 
JFK. Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1987), 148.
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Commander sent the last message to Washington, "Am 
destroying all equipment and communications. I have nothing 
left to fight with. Am taking to the woods. I cannot wait 
for you." Shortly after nightfall the resistance ended.63
Prior to the cessation of fighting, the Navy began the 
evacuation operation. Burke directed Dennison to send in 
two destroyers to Blue Beach to check on the possibility of 
evacuating the CEF. Reconnaissance flights over the beach 
were authorized. Active air to air combat was allowed but 
no attacks against ground forces were authorized.64 
Dennison passed on the directions to Clark who coordinated 
the rescue operation through Crutchfield on the Eaton. The 
Eaton and Murray pulled into the bay to check for survivors. 
After hearing that CEF soldiers were jumping into the bay to 
swim to the ships, Burke ordered Dennison and Clark to 
evacuate the force on Blue Beach to the best of their 
ability. In the message to Dennison, Burke expressed 
concern about getting forces off the beach. Burke passed to 
Dennison, "We are extremely reluctant to become engaged but 
as long as we have some prospects of saving significant 
numbers of people to make hazards worthwhile, save the 
people." If the Eaton and Murray were fired on by Cuban 
tanks or artillery, authority was given to protect
^Taylor Report, Part ill, Annex 22, p. 11.
MTaylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab K, "JCS 
Message 994382 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 191657ZAPR61."
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themselves while on the "humanitarian mission." If there 
were large numbers that could be recovered, Clark was 
ordered to inform the JCS as soon as possible so that they 
could announce that the U.S. would assist in the 
evacuation.65
While conducting the evacuation JCS warned CINCLANT to 
standby to provide fighter support for the rescue effort. 
CINCLANT directed the commanding officer of the Key West 
Naval Air Station to prepare six unmarked F-3Hs for possible 
use against Cuba. Amphibious Squadron Two was directed to 
get its ship's landing craft ready for the evacuation. The 
USS independence (CVA 62) task force, enroute to the 
Caribbean, was ordered to speed up and stand off Guantanamo 
and wait for further orders. The ships in Guantanamo 
sortied and prepared for action if necessary.66
On the night of 19 April the Eaton moved to the top of 
the bay, almost running aground in the process. Crutchfield 
directed two junior officers from the Eaton to take the 
motor whale boat and a rubber raft and go to the western 
swampy side of the bay and pick up as many troops as the 
boats could handle. The officers took a signalman, 
radioman, and boatswain mate with them to the beach. They 
were armed with rifles and .45 caliber pistols. They were
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab L, "JCS 
Message 994392 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 191812ZAPR61."
^Dennison, 354.
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ordered not to leave the boat but the waves were so choppy 
in the bay that it was impossible to get people into the 
boats. They decided to land the boats. The first group of 
refugees included Gray Lynch, the CIA agent who participated 
in the initial landing. A total of seventeen survivors were 
picked up in two nights of rescue operations.67
The rescue operations continued into Thursday night,
20 April. The CIA operations officers on the Blaqar and 
Barbara J. Lynch and William !:Rip" Robertson, had been 
rescued off the beach and transferred to the Essex with 
Crutchfield for debriefings with Admiral Clark. After the 
meeting, Lynch, Robertson, and UDT personnel were sent back 
to the beach in the motor whale boat of the Eaton to check 
on the validity of the information regarding survivors still 
hiding in the bushes. The rescuers used loud speakers and 
searched the mangrove swamps on the western side of the bay. 
With protection from the Navy destroyers and air cover, 
Castro's helicopters stood off and observed the rescue 
process. It was difficult for the rescuers to convince the 
survivors to come out of the swamps because of the 
helicopters flying over the bay. When they left the bushes, 
they were transferred to the Eaton and then later to the 
Essex.68
^Smoot, 15-20.
C OTaylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, pp. 7-8.
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The Eaton. unaccompanied, pulled in as close to the 
shore as possible. Cuban tanks opened fire and bracketed 
the Eaton. The Eaton moved out of the bay to get out of the 
range of Castro's guns. Late Thursday night the Eaton 
returned and towed several amphibious barges out of the bay 
and transferred them to ships of Amphibious Squadron Two,
USS Chilton (APA 38) and USS Thuban (AKA 19)•®9
Upon direction of Kennedy, Burke directed Clark to 
take charge of the CEF and escort the ships to Vieques. 
Continued destroyer patrols off Blue Beach were authorized 
to search for possible survivors. In what Crutchfield 
called "one of the strangest" orders he had ever received, 
Burke gave the commanding officer of the Eaton permission to 
ground his ship without fear of any repercussions if it 
would make the mission easier. The Eaton was directed to 
stay within sight of land during the night and outside of 
Cuban guns during the day. Crutchfield was directed to 
repeat the patrols on 21 April.70 In retrospect, the order 
to allow the commanding officer to ground his ship was not 
strange at all. Burke felt that at that stage in the 
operation something as drastic as grounding the rescue ship 
might facilitate the mission. Burke was willing to use 
military force to rescue the ship and suppress any Cuban
69Smoot, 14.
70Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab N, "JCS 
Message 994569 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 210046ZAPR61," pp. 1-2.
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threat. The primary concern was the evacuation of any
survivors. If the Cubans decided to open fire on the
American forces, Burke and Dennison were prepared to respond
militarily. According to Burke, he was willing to support
the ships trying to rescue the survivors:
There is nothing worse than to be put out cn a limb 
and realize that nobody gives a damn about wnether you 
come back or not. I would have sent people in after 
[them]. You've got to do that. You can't send people 
into battle and say sacrifice yourself. Even if you 
have to risk putting the nation at war. Or you don't 
do a damn thing.71
The Eaton and Murray remained in the vicinity until
Saturday, April 22. The ships of Task Group 81.8 began
arriving in Norfolk on 30 April with no fanfare. The crews
were directed to refrain from talking about the operation to
anyone. The cloak of secrecy was still in place and
remains, with some, to this day.72
71Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
^Krisel interview, 31 August 1988.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROFILES IN TIMIDITY OR WEAKNESS IN STRENGTH?
The remaining CEF ships left Cuba and sailed to 
Vieques with their Navy escorts. Contingencies such as the 
lack of air superiority and logistical reinforcements played 
major roles in the failure of the mission. The Navy, having 
warned of such contingencies, was asked to come to the 
rescue of the operation after there was little chance of 
reviving it. The only thing that the White House could do 
was pull back the forces and admit to the defeat. Castro 
glowed because he successfully gave the U.S. a black eye and 
bloody nose.
After the debacle at the Bay of Pigs Kennedy quickly 
accepted the blame for the failure of the operation. His 
willingness to accept responsibility diverted a great deal 
of negative attention away from the White House. In 
conversations with his closest advisers Kennedy said, 
"There's an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers 
and defeat is an orphan."1 But behind closed doors Kennedy 
was enraged by the perceived lack of support he received 
from the CIA and JCS. There were several holdovers from the
1Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York: 
Greenwich House, 1965), 289.
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Eisenhower Administration, especially in the CIA and JCS. 
Kennedy could handle the CIA. He played with the idea of 
appointing his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, to relieve 
Dulles. The military posed a greater problem to Kennedy. 
Admiral Burke was a hero to Kennedy dating back to World War 
II. The Bay of Pigs taught Kennedy an important lesson. 
Kennedy claimed that he would never again be in awe of the 
military.2 In review of the Bay of Pigs operation, it seems 
unfair to lay the. blame on the CIA and JCS. In fact the 
White House was just as responsible as any other party.
Kennedy asked former Army Chief of Staff General 
Maxwell Taylor to come out of retirement and head a 
committee to investigate the causes of the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco. Other members of the committee included the Robert 
F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke. The Taylor 
Committee reviewed evidence, listened to testimony, and drew 
a conclusion for submission to the President.
The Taylor Committee concluded that the causes of the 
failure at the Bay of Pigs were widespread. The sinking of 
the Rio Escondido and Houston created a drastic shortage of 
ammunition. The Rio Escondido held ten days of reserve 
ammunition. The Houston should have been able to off-load 
prior to being sunk, but the problems created by the failure 
of the landing craft to operate and the general lethargy of
2Ibid., 289-90.
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the 5th Battalion were difficult to overcome. The majority 
of the forces' ammunition was concentrated on those two 
ships. Constant air attacks by the Cuban Air Force caused 
delays in the transfer of supplies and replenishment to the 
beach because the CEF ships were forced to head out to sea 
to avoid being hit by enemy missiles. The retreat of the 
Atlantico and Caribe forced undue delays in the transfer of 
supplies to the landing force.3
The Taylor Committee found that tne Cuban Air Force 
maintained air superiority because the initial air strike 
failed to destroy the airplanes on the ground, especially 
the T-33s. The need for secrecy placed restraints on the 
anti-Castro air force. The restraints included using B-26s 
as combat aircraft because the B-26 was widely distributed 
throughout the region, and therefore no clear ties could be 
drawn to the U.S. In order to remain covert, the operation 
was limited to pre-invasion air strikes launched from non- 
U.S. controlled air fields. Because the CEF had to use air 
strips far from the objective area, pilot fatigue forced the 
use of American contract pilots. Restrictions on the use of 
certain types of ammunition, especially napalm, hindered the 
force's ability to neutralize and destroy its targets
3General Maxwell Taylor, "Taylor Committee Report and 
Memorandum for the Record of Paramilitary Study Group 
Meeting, Part I," Memorandum 2, John F. Kennedy Library, 
Boston, Massachusetts, pp. 1-2. Hereafter cited as "Taylor 
Report."
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because of the need to remain covert.
The most important conclusion of the Taylor Report 
concerned the cancellation of the second air strike. The 
ramifications ran deep. The cancellation wiped out the 
possibility of eliminating Castro's air force. The report 
concluded that "the cancellation seems to have resulted 
partly from [the] failure to make the air strike plan 
extremely clear in advance to the President and Secretary of 
State." The Taylor Report concluded that the planners were 
guilty of not forcefully informing the President of the 
military repercussions of a last minute cancellation.
Because of its structure the Executive Branch was not 
organizationally prepared to handle such a vast paramilitary 
operation. The report stressed that there was not a single 
authority capable of coordinating the actions of the CIA, 
Department of Defense, State Department, and the U.S. 
Information Agency, short of the President. The report 
found that "top level direction was given through ad hoc 
meetings of senior officials without consideration of 
operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for 
recording conclusions and [the] decisions reached."4
Based on their findings the committee noted that the 
exiles fought well and inflicted considerable losses on the 
Cuban forces. Contrary to the view that control of the air
4Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 2, pp. 2-4.
k
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would be vital for the brigade to survive, the Cubans' 
numerical superiority reduced the probability of success to 
nil. The limited numbers of B-26 pilots flying from 
Nicaragua made continuous air support tenuous. The option 
of inserting guerrilla forces to undermine Castro's strength 
was nearly impossible because of Castro's encirclement and 
eventual forcing of the brigade back to the beachhead.
Under these conditions the beachhead could not have survived 
without Cuban uprisings or overt American support. Although 
the guerrilla option could not succeed, with control of the 
air, the brigade could have been evacuated by sea and air.5
The limitations on the operation reduced the 
probability of success. It was impossible for such a small 
landing force to occupy a thirty-six mile beachhead. With 
no air support and a limited number of pilots, the CEF air 
force had little chance of succeeding. Even though the 
intent was to infiltrate the jungles and head into the 
Escambray Mountains if the operation failed, planners were 
guilty of overlooking the fact that the Zapata region 
primarily consisted of swamps and marshes and was located 
over ninety miles from the mountains. The President and 
other senior officials were advised that it would be an easy 
transition from an invasion force to guerrilla force. The 
JCS, for their part, reviewed the Zapata Plan and gave it a
5Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 26.
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lukewarm approval, although they preferred the Trinidad
Flan. The Taylor Report concluded that this point was never
brought up to administration officials. As a body the JCS
reviewed the plan piecemeal and only within a limited
context. Differing opinions among the JCS should have been
brought to the attention of the President.6
The Taylor Committee found that an operation such as
the Bay of Pigs was an example of a paramilitary operation
suited to the Cold War and that the country should be
prepared to engage in it. If the country participated in a
paramilitary operation, it must do so with a high
probability of success. The report stated,
Such operations should be planned and executed by a 
governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, 
in addition to military and covert techniques, all 
other forces, political, economic, ideological, and 
intelligence, which can contribute to its success.
No such mechanism presently exists but should be 
created to plan, coordinate and further a national 
Cold War strategy capable of involving paramilitary 
operations.7
The committee recommended the establishment of a Strategic 
Resource Group supported by a Cold War Indication Center 
which allowed the focusing the resources on the objectives 
of the Cold War.® The establishment of such a group would 
have effectively taken all paramilitary plans and operations
®Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 3, pp. 2-3.
7Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 3, p. 3.
®Taylor Report, Part I, "Letter to the President, 13
July 1961."
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out of the hands of the CIA and JCS and would have placed
them in the hands of a centralized command responding
directly to the President.
The Taylor Report is a historical document that gives
a detailed chronology of the Bay of Pigs operation. Some of
its findings are questionable. The committee was
established to explain to the President why tne Bay of Pigs
operation failed. Opinions tended to hide the true
responsibility for the failure of the operation. According
to Commander George Mitchell, aide to Admiral Burke who
attended the Taylor Committee sessions, "It was a complete
whitewash." Mitchell claimed that the writing was on the
wall prior to the committee's convening. It was not
intended to reveal the entire story, only what senior
administration officials wanted to hear. Mitchell stated
that the Attorney General was regularly calling the
President to report on the meetings and the direction they
were heading.9 Burke understood the rationale behind the
Attorney General's actions:
Bobby Kennedy was not going to let his big brother 
take any blame at all. He was protecting his brother. 
That's natural. He was very ardent about it and very 
good at it.10
9Captain George Mitchell, USN (Ret), interview by 
author, 31 August 1988, telephone, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
10Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interview by 
author, 16 September 1988, tape recording, Fairfax, 
Virginia.
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In an interview with journalist Hanson Baldwin, the Attorney 
General tried to divert the blame away from the President 
towards the JCS. He stated, "Have you looked at the role of 
the JCS in this? They're the ones to blame. You ought to 
investigate that."11
Burke was so sure that the committee was trying to 
blame the Navy that he directed the Navy Judge Advocate 
General to prepare a defense that he could have in hand if 
he needed it. Admiral Burke did not want the Navy to 
receive blame for what it did or did not do.12
The Taylor Report fails to stress several major 
problems of the operation. There was a shortage of 
ammunition because the Rio Escondido and Houston were sunk 
by Cuban missiles on D-Day. The initial air strike was 
supposed to destroy the Cuban Air Force. The planned second 
strike dealt with the possibility of having to attack those 
aircraft not destroyed in the initial strike. The 
President's decision to cancel the second air strike allowed 
the Cuban Air Force to maintain air superiority over the 
beachhead. The retreat of the Atl5ntico and Caribe was due 
to the continued air strikes and lack of air support in 
their defense. Burke questioned the administration's
"Hanson W. Baldwin, Interview by Dr. John P. Mason,
Jr., September 1978, Oral History Collection, United States 
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 679.
12Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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understanding of the threat of war and the ramifications of
their actions:
War is risky. The bigger the operation, the bigger 
the risks. It's harder to accomplish. [You] can't 
have an operation without danger.13
Even if the operation failed, with air support on hand, the
guerrillas might have been able to escape to the hills and
then on to the mountains.
Throughout the planning phases of the operation,
Kennedy was informed and advised of the nature of the air
strikes. Throughout March and April, Bissell and Dulles
briefed the President and Secretary of State of the various
options available in the operation. The failure of the
military and civilian planners "forcefully" to argue their
case to the President concerning the repercussions of
cancelling the second air strike begs the question: how
"forceful" does one have to be when continually briefing the
President? Burke and Bissell readily admitted that they
didn't "pound the desk" to voice their objections over the
cancellation of the second air strike. Even if they had,
their input would have been limited. By the end of D-Day,
information getting to and from the President was filtered
by his closest advisers. Little if any military advice
reached the President. Kennedy made the mistake of "trying
to ride two horses." He was faced with arguments for and
13Ibid.
L.
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against the invasion. Those opposed to Castro argued that 
the invasion must take place and not fail. Opponents of the 
invasion argued that "masked aggression" was immoral. The 
problem was that the plan had little likelihood of success 
and there was little chance of keeping U.S. involvement 
covert. Kennedy tried to compromise.14 In a life and death 
situation like the Bay of Pigs there should be no 
compromises. If there were any doubts, Kennedy should have 
stopped the invasion before it got underway.
In retrospect the CIA, JCS, the Navy, and the White 
House should have shared responsibility for the failure.
The CIA underestimated the actual strength of Castro's 
regime and forces. Had the beachhead been secured and had 
Castro been unable to drive the invading force cff the "beach 
with his regime intact, a stalemate might have occurred. In 
that case the OAS would have been called in to act as an 
intermediary and supervise negotiations. The operation did 
not materialize as planned. Castro had more support from 
the populace and military than the CIA expected. The CIA 
found that it was difficult to conduct such a large 
amphibious campaign without support from within and without
14Victor Lasky, JFK: The Man and the Myth (New York:
Macmillan,
1963), 516.
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Cuba.15 The CIA's failure to plan for such contingencies 
was crucial to the operation's downfall. The CIA concocted 
the idea, planned it, reviewed it, evaluated it, and 
executed it without the complete support of other 
governmental agencies. The CIA's double role as 
intelligence gatherer and policy-maker hampered a truly 
objective point of view. There was no evidence of an 
internal review of the plan. The CIA "fell in love with the 
plan and ceased to think critically of it."16
The JCS the Navy can be faulted for not adequately 
informing the President of the pros and cons of the various 
plans. Although asked to review the plans, the JCS remained 
in a position of observing another government agency's 
operation. Admiral Burke and the Navy allowed themselves to 
become so intent on removing Castro from power that they 
ignored the shortcomings in order to carry out the 
operation. The JCS might have reviewed and made 
recommendations that would have made the plan work. As the 
chief military advisers to the President, that was their 
responsibility. The Joint Chiefs should have taken the plan 
"down to the deck plates" to expose every weakness. A risky 
operation like the Bay of Pigs deserved scrupulous detailed
15Richard Bissell, Interview by Ed Edwin, 5 June 1967, 
Oral History Research Office, Butler Library, Columbia 
University, New York, 26-31.
16Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion: The
Chronicle of Disaster (New York: Praeger, 1962), 104.
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examination. Had specific details been raised, questions 
and discussions would have created a greater flow of 
communications between the interested parties.17 But the 
Joint Chiefs were blinded by the possibility of removing 
Castro from power. Like the CIA, the JCS lost their 
objectivity because of their desire to remove Castro.
A share of the blame has to be placed on Kennedy. The 
blame does not rest entirely on Kennedy because of his 
decision to cancel the second air strike. Rather, Kennedy 
was at fault because of his failure to understand the true 
uses and limitations of power. Admiral Burke claimed that 
Kennedy used power like it was a never-ending game.13 His 
insistence that the CIA conduct the operation in complete 
secrecy devoid of any overt U.S. involvement lacked sound 
judgment. Once military force is employed, its origins can 
not be hidden by painting the hull numbers of ships, or 
using unmarked Navy airplanes. If a President uses force to 
seek a political objective, he must understand the political 
and military ramifications of his actions. The Navy could 
have made the plan work, but then Kennedy would have had no 
way to hide American complicity in the operation. In 
hindsight, it might have made more political sense to back
17Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and 
his Joint Chiefs of Staff.." (Ph.D. diss., University of 
South Carolina, 1981), 177.
18Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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out before the operation began. Instead, Kennedy put 
American prestige on the line by allowing the operation to 
go ahead without the necessary military support. Kennedy 
should have considered these options prior to giving the go- 
ahead for the operation. Burke was correct in believing 
that Kennedy did not understand the capabilities of force in 
accomplishing a foreign policy objective.19 The appearance 
of implied strength and the failure to take advantage of
- v
that strength created a lack of credibility and a strategic 
political failure for the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs.
The Navy's participation in the Bay of Pigs has been
faulted. But in reality the Navy had been put into a
position of trying to make a poor plan work. Throughout the
operation Admiral Burke's and Dennison's hands were tied by 
the White House. Burke was critical of those in positions 
of responsibility who faulted the Navy even though he 
thought the Navy did everything it could make the plan 
succeed:
I don't think the Navy could have done anything better 
under the circumstances. Of course there is always 
room for improvement. There are always people who 
should have been told that weren't. Always people who 
were incompetent in the line of responsibility and 
line of action that didn't do what they should have 
done. [It] always happens. And always will. That's 
why there's multiple resources in the military for one 
man to pick up the ball if another man fails. He does 
it automatically without anybody saying, 'It's your 
turn now.' They do that. That's why the military is 
more apt to be successful in operations that require
19Ibid.
L
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innovation and decisions on the spot than [are] 
civilians. Civilians are not used to taking 
responsibility for something they aren't directly 
responsible for.20
Secrecy and security were more important than the conduct of
the mission. Strategically, Burke and Dennison had strong
reasons for wanting Castro out of Cuba. The administration
should have relied on military force coordinated by the JCS
and the Navy, not the CIA, if it wanted to seek the
political objective cf removing Castro from power. It was
worth the use of American force to eradicate a strategic
threat from Cuba while suffering short-term political
setbacks. The Navy had the opportunity to try to drive
Castro out of power, but there was a breakdown in the
relationship between military leaders and policy makers.
The policy makers in the administration were at fault for
failing to heed the advice of the military. As a result,
Castro's regime was solidified even more after the Bay of
Pigs. Kennedy's failure to support the invasion at the Bay
of Pigs gave Castro a strong dose of credibility in the eyes
of the world. The fact remains that Castro remains in power
and Cuba appears to be firmly entrenched in the communist
camp for the indefinite future.
“ibid.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
When I began this project the first warning I received 
was that there was very little information available. The 
possibility of "spinning my wheels" was always possible.
The warnings were correct. There is very little 
declassified information available concerning the Bay of 
Pigs operation, especially from the Navy. In addition to 
the limitations on the amount of printed information 
available, there are some people who still refuse to talk 
about the operation in fear of breaching security. Some 
people talked to me on the grounds that I not publish what 
they told me. I agreed. But in order to do a concise 
perspective of the American naval involvement, I had to back 
track from what I was told in confidence and try to verify 
through other open sources. To a certain extent, I was 
successful.
My primary source of information was the Taylor 
Committee Report. The report was the foundation of my 
study. The report was still classified in many places, but, 
through my interviews, I was able to piece together much of 
the operation. Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), provided 
insightful information from the perspective of the Joint
130
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Chiefs of staff (JCS). Captain Lionel Krisel, USN (Ret), 
Admiral Burke's historian of the Bay of Pigs operation, 
provided information concerning the details of the operation 
and those involved. His thorough and concise information 
filled many gaps in the operation cloaked in security.
Others involved in the operation were willing to 
discuss their participation. Admiral Robert R. Crutchfield, 
USN (Ret), the on-scene commander at Bay of Pigs, provided 
invaluable information that is not available in any 
references. Commander Jose Perez, USN (Ret), was a B-26 
pilot for the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF). During the 
Bay of Pigs operation he was shot down by Cuban anti-air 
defense fire while conducting a strike on D-Day. Following 
the operation he came to the United States and joined the 
Navy. Commander Perez described the training aspects of the 
operation followed by the air strikes and invasion. Captain 
James W. Griffin, USN (Ret), was the Commanding Officer of 
the USS Tnreadfin (SS 410). The Threadfin's missions were 
cloaked in secrecy and Captain Griffin was reluctant to 
discuss any of them. Yet he did acknowledge that the 
Threadfin was involved in the operation.
My most interesting interview, ironically, was the 
least valuable. Mr. Jack Pfeifer, until last year, was 
Historian for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He is 
currently involved in a lengthy legal dispute with the CIA 
concerning information he researched while historian at the
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Agency. The CIA has refused to release any information 
concerning the operation. His value, although not directly 
pertaining to my study, centered around the various CIA 
actions taken prior to, during, and after the failed 
operation.
The Oral History Collection at the United States Naval 
Institute was an invaluable source of information. Dr. John 
P. Mason, Jr., and Paul Stillwell's concise and indepth 
interviews provided information on the operation from not 
only the Navy's point of view, such as Admiral Horatio 
Rivero, Admiral Alfred Ward and Admiral William Mack, but 
also the press, such as the Oral History of news reporter 
Hanson W. Baldwin. The Oral History Collection provided 
information that could not be attained through personal 
interviews.
Pieces of the operation that could not be attained 
from interviews was attained through the various deck logs 
of the ships involved. Unfortunately some deck logs do not 
exist. Of all the ships in the operation, only the deck log 
of the USS Essex (CVA 9) is missing from the Record Center 
of the National Arch' res. Based on information gathered 
from the staff at the National Archives, the CIA made an 
attempt to clear all files dealing with the operation. All 
paperwork and documents concerning the operation were 
supposed to be turned over to Kennedy Administration 
officials and the CIA. Some institutions were less than
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willing to agree. The deck logs that still remain have the 
ship's position block erased and the words "Special 
Operations" written in it. Yet, the USS Elokomin (AO 55) 
deck logs clearly state their its geographical position and 
the names of the ships that it refueled which made it easy 
to pin-point the location and composition of the task force.
Much of the information from the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library and John F. Kennedy Library is still closed. Of the 
information open to researchers, some of Eisenhower's 
personal papers, the Taylor Report, and McGeorge Bundy's 
Papers were the most valuable. The sensitive classification 
of the majority of the information dealing with the Bay of 
Pigs and the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba is the 
primary reason for the lack of information available.
Secondary sources provided a good background of 
information, pro and con. The doting histories of the 
Kennedy Administration, Kennedy by Theodore Sorenson, and A 
Thousand Days, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., gave detailed 
accountings of the Kennedy days. As insider's accounts of 
the Kennedy Administration, these works tended to be biased 
in favor of their subject. Sorenson and Schlesinger's works 
balance well Victor Lasky's JFK: The Man and the Myth.
Lasky tried to peel through the Kennedy mystique to give a 
differing opinion of the President and his Administration. 
Although differing in nature, these sources were examples of 
the secondary sources that were abundant and that provided a
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well-rounded scope of information.
Sources ranging from personal interviews, oral 
histories, and government documents, to books, magazines, 
and newspapers were instrumental in the support of my 
thesis.
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